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Toward a Nexus of Virtue
Ronald J. Colombo *
Abstract
Corporate law, like all law, should be directed toward the
common good. The common good requires that corporate activity
be restrained, if not actively directed, by human virtue. An
analysis of the corporate enterprise suggests that those corporate
actors with the greatest stake in the exercise of virtue, and best
positioned to influence corporate activity via the exercise of
virtuous judgment, are the corporation’s officers. Thus, one of the
primary objectives of corporate law should be to promote virtue
among corporate officers.
Contrary to what some might assume, the promotion of virtue
among corporate officers need not entail a promulgation of “thou
shalls” and “thou shall nots.” Indeed, the suggestions put forth in
this Article would serve to broaden, rather than narrow, the
liberty of corporate officers. This is because corporate law, as
currently constituted and interpreted, works to inhibit the exercise
of virtue.
The need for virtue-directed corporate decision making has
been demonstrated repeatedly over the course of history, most
recently by the financial crisis. Instead of focusing on virtue,
however, the response of most policymakers and commentators has
been to focus on regulatory reform. This is unfortunate. Although
regulatory reform certainly has its place, it holds limited promise
* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. I thank
Notre Dame University School of Law for inviting me to present an earlier draft
of this Article at its 2011 “Governance and Business Ethics in a Post-Crisis
World”; the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities for
allowing me to present an earlier draft at its 14th annual conference; and my
own Hofstra University School of Law for permitting me to present a draft at its
faculty workshop series. On each occasion, I received helpful feedback from
individuals too numerous to mention. I am also indebted to Chapin Cimino, Dan
Greenwood, Lyman Johnson, Brian McCall, and Judd Sneirson for their
suggestions and comments throughout the drafting process, and to Cynthia
Thomas for her exquisite research assistance.
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of success for a variety of important reasons. A wiser approach
would focus more seriously on virtue—the force most capable of
preventing a repeat of the fraud and dereliction of duty that
marked the recent financial crisis (and most predecessor crises as
well).
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I. Introduction
Could virtue have prevented the financial crisis? Possibly.
Although the predominant narrative has characterized the
crisis as one of inadequate financial regulation 1 (rebutted by an
1. See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Saving the Global Financial System:
International Financial Reforms and United States Financial Reform, Will They
Do the Job?, 43 UCC L.J. 479, 504 (2010) (identifying “failures in government
regulation and oversight” as one cause of the crisis); Joseph William Singer,
Economic Regulation and the Rule of Law: Minimum Standards for the Legal
Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 48 JUDGES’ J. 4, 4 (2009) (“[W]e got
into this mess . . . partly because of inadequate regulation.”).
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opposite diagnosis, which lays the blame essentially on too much
regulation 2), sustained attention has not been focused upon the
critical roles that virtue and character (or, more aptly, the lack
thereof) have played. 3 Instead of framing the crisis as essentially a
matter of improperly structured economic incentives, one could
easily frame the crisis as largely the result of rampant nonfeasance 4
and malfeasance. 5 Such a framing would suggest a different set of
responses due to recognition that virtuous dispositions would have
countered such ethical shortcomings. (Among the many virtues
implicated here would be justice, courage, and truthfulness, 6 in
addition to the virtue of simply doing one’s duty. 7) In short, and with
2. The regulation is in the form of government intervention in the
economy, especially with regard to the monetary policy and the housing market.
See, e.g., Robert Higgs, Cumulating Policy Consequences, Frightened
Overreactions, and the Current Surge of Government’s Size, Scope, and Power,
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 531, 531 (2010) (“[The crisis’s] roots lie, first, in
government policies to promote more widespread homeownership than would
occur in a free market and, second, in the Federal Reserve System’s
mismanagement of interest rates and the money stock.”); Editorial, Dodd–
Frank’s Faulty Rx, INV. BUS. DAILY, May 18, 2011, at A7 (“Overregulation is
what fed the subprime bubble. And their remedy—more regulation—is more
poison.”).
3. There have been exceptions. See, e.g., John Mixon, Neoclassical
Economics and the Erosion of Middle-Class Values: An Explanation for
Economic Collapse, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 327 (2010); Ben G.
Pender II, Invigorating the Role of the In-House Legal Advisor as Steward in
Ethical Cultural and Governance at Client-Business Organizations: From 21st
Century Failures to True Calling, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 91 (2009).
4. The nonfeasance is in the form of corporate managers failing to act with
due caution and prudence in their decision making. See Barry Ritholtz, Putting
an End to “I’ll Be Gone, You’ll Be Gone” Bonuses, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2011, at
G6 (describing the actions taken by those in the financial industry as
“reckless”); Adam Shell, Paul Davidson & John Waggoner, Finding Blame:
Crisis Inquiry Panel Calls Recession Avoidable, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 2011, at
1B (stating that many were aware of the risks but took them anyway).
5. The malfeasance is in the form of outright fraud. See Greg Gordon,
Justice Department Eyes Possible Wall Street Fraud, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan.
15, 2010, at A6 (“[T]he Justice Department is investigating whether lenders or
Wall Street firms defrauded investors in the sale of risky mortgage
securities . . . .”); Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with
Little Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at A1 (discussing why there have been
few prosecutions for fraud).
6. See Geoff Moore, Humanizing Business: A Modern Virtue Ethics
Approach, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 237, 251 (2005) (listing the virtues that
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre views as important).
7. “Doing one’s duty” is traditionally at the minimum of virtuous behavior.
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apologies to the National Rifle Association, regulation (inadequate
or otherwise) didn’t kill the economy—people killed the economy. 8
Given the predominant narrative, it comes as no surprise that
the policy prescriptions that have followed the most recent financial
crises (such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 9 in 2002 and the Dodd–
Frank Act 10 in 2010) focus on regulation and not people. Put
differently, these prescriptions do not attempt to lead market
participants to better behavior via an improvement of character—
they simply require better behavior. 11 As shall be discussed, it is far
from clear that the imposition of mandatory rules and regulations
can foster the development of virtue and bring about the kind of
improvement in character that is so critically needed to forestall the
next financial crisis. 12 Indeed, one could fairly say that by failing to
consider virtue as a part of the solution, both Sarbanes–Oxley and
Dodd–Frank largely rely on the very same principles and types of
solutions that “took the economy to the brink of collapse.” 13 As one
See Ekow N. Yankah, Virtue’s Domain, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (“To have
never been more graceful than your duty, more generous or forgiving, would feel
a sort of shallow victory. In short, one wishes not to have only been dutiful but
to have been virtuous.”).
8. See Guns Don’t Kill People, People Kill People, URBANDICTIONARY.COM,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=guns%20don%27t%20kill%20
people%2C%20people%20kill%20people (last visited Jan..30, 2012) (discussing
the meaning of the NRA slogan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
9. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
10. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
11. One exception to this would be the executive compensation provisions of
the Dodd–Frank Act, which attempt merely to shame corporate actors away
from awarding unseemly pay packages to their high-ranking officials. See Ben
Protess, In Split Vote, S.E.C. Adopts Rules on Corporate Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2011, at B4 (“Although the shareholders’ votes [on executive compensation]
are only symbolic, dissension among a majority of investors could embarrass a
company.”); Reynolds Holding, Companies Pay Price for Ignoring Say-on-Pay
Votes, REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS (May 7, 2011) http://blogs.reuters.com/columns/
2011/05/06/companies-pay-price-for-ignoring-say-on-pay-votes/ (last visited Jan.
30, 2012) (“A negative vote can lead to bad publicity or the ouster of directors.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See infra Part III.B (discussing the limits of law in generating virtue).
13. See Christopher Landau, Can Religion Help the Economic Crisis?, BBC
NEWS, Sept. 25, 2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/business/
8275498.stm (discussing alternative principles and solutions, such as religion);
see also William Arthur Wines & J. Brooke Hamilton III, Observations on the
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article put it, we need remedies “different from those designed to
prevent the greedy, the power obsessed, or the completely selfinterested from breaking the law or acting unethically.” 14
Finally, and particularly disturbing, an examination of the past
crises suggests that the problem facing corporate America runs
deeper than simply bad people doing bad things—it seems to extend
to good people doing bad things as well. 15 This opens the possibility
that existing law and regulation not only fail to promote virtue but
may actually be working to undermine it. 16
This Article argues that policymakers should take into account
character and virtue more seriously than they do currently. It
suggests further that a good place to start would be the field of
corporate law.
In so doing—by focusing on character and virtue, instead of
economics, rules, and regulations—this Article proffers a “virtueethics” approach to corporate governance. For unlike more common
ethical systems, which are ordinarily utilitarian or duty-based,
virtue ethics stresses the role of character and individual morality. 17
In the pages that follow, I shall make the case for applying
virtue ethics to corporate law. Part II of this Article will provide a
background and summary of virtue-ethics philosophy. This will be
brief because this Article is not (at least not primarily) a
contribution to the debate over the merits or shortcomings of virtue
ethics—such a conversation is best left to full-time philosophers.
Instead, this Article adopts virtue ethics largely as given, and
focuses instead on its applicability to corporate law.
That said, before getting to the question of applicability, Part
III offers a few reasons why virtue is a necessary supplement to
Need to Redesign Organizations and to Refocus Corporation Law to Promote
Ethical Behavior and Discourage Illegal Conduct, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 43, 51
(2004) (“Sarbanes–Oxley, while certainly well-intentioned, falls short for several
reasons. It might more accurately be considered a modest first step by Congress
rather than a solution.”).
14. Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 75.
15. See id. at 54 (“When the business in which they work . . . threatens
their welfare unless they act illegally or unethically, or conditions rewards on
illegal or unethical actions, good people will do bad things.”).
16. See RONALD R. SIMS, ETHICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING: A
CALL FOR RENEWAL 21 (1994) (discussing authors who have argued that
“organizational life frequently pushes individuals to behave unethically”).
17. See infra Part II (describing the components of virtue ethics).
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legal rules and regulation. It does so by discussing the serious
limitations on law’s ability to rein in misconduct (on both practical
and theoretical levels). Shifting gears a bit, Part III also explores the
law’s limited ability to inculcate virtue, explaining that virtue is best
achieved via conduct that is voluntary (versus coerced).
Part IV is where virtue ethics is used to analyze both the
corporation and corporate law. Its objective is to articulate a vision
of the corporation consistent with virtue-ethics principles, and to
consider the degree to which corporate law as currently constructed
conforms to that vision. Since the prevailing paradigm of corporate
law is contractarian, Part IV undertakes its analysis within the
confines of the “nexus of contracts” conceptualization of the
corporation.
This Article concludes that a corporation’s officers ought to be
the focal point of any discussion of corporate ethics, based upon their
own personal interests and their unique role in the firm. If, as I
posit, our desideratum is corporations that are ethically managed,
then we need corporate officers who are individuals of virtue. In
other words, virtuous corporate officers are the critical means by
which we can achieve the desired end of better corporate conduct. 18
Consequently, corporations and corporate law should prioritize
the development of virtue among corporate officers. There are a
variety of ways in which corporations and corporate law can do this
(some of which will be briefly explored), but the simplest and most
significant would be to provide management with more avenues to
exercise virtue.
II. Virtue Ethics
Before delving into the application of virtue ethics to corporate
let us first explore the philosophical underpinnings of virtuebased ethics. 20 As virtue ethics is a field of study that is ancient yet
law,19

18. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 105 (“It stands to reason that organizational
decision making can be improved if employees can be encouraged to think
ethically and to approximate more closely effective and ethical decision
making.”).
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Virtue ethics, like all philosophies, certainly has its fair share of critics.
See, e.g., William Frankena, A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethical Systems, in
ETHICAL THEORY: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 334 (Louis P. Pojman
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still developing, a great deal of variation may exist between the
approach taken by one virtue ethicist and the next. 21 Yet certain
generalizations (or, in some cases, editorial choices on my part) can
and must be made.
Modern virtue ethics can be traced back to Elizabeth
Anscombe’s 1958 article entitled Modern Moral Philosophy. 22
Anscombe’s article put into words a growing dissatisfaction with the
utilitarian and deontological theories of ethics that had dominated
philosophical debate for the last couple of centuries—dissatisfaction
linked toward the advocacy of “bad actions, or impossible actions, or
no action at all” in the face of a moral quandary. 23 Anscombe
suggested an approach that was both entirely different and quite
ancient. 24 Anscombe suggested a focus on character and virtue. 25
One preliminary distinction between aretaic (or virtue-based)
ethical systems and most others is that the aretaic systems can
be characterized as focused primarily upon “being,” whereas most
other systems can be said to focus on duty or effects. 26 A related
ed., 2d ed. 1995); Robert Louden, Some Vices of Virtue Ethics, in ETHICAL
THEORY: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 347 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 2d
ed. 1995) [hereinafter ETHICAL THEORY]. Although in this section I shall sketch
the basics of virtue-based ethics, and proffer a justification of the same, this
Article is not a piece of philosophy per se and will not attempt to methodically
and critically weigh the merits of ethics philosophy versus competing systems.
In other words, I shall be accepting virtue ethics as given and applying it to
corporations and corporate law.
21. See Sarah Conly, Flourishing and the Failure of the Ethics of Virtue, in
XIII MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 83, 84 (Peter French et al. eds., 1988)
(describing the different approaches taken by virtue ethicists); see also ROBERT
C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS
115–17 (1992) (distinguishing the author’s approach to virtue ethics from other
approaches).
22. See NOEL STEWART, ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY
54, 54 (2009) (“What started as a trickle, with an article by Elizabeth
Anscombe . . . has now become a groundswell of books and articles
advocating . . . virtue ethics.”).
23. Id.
24. See id. (“Aristotle is the ancient but major inspiration behind the recent
surge in virtue ethics, which is challenging the supremacy of the three actioncentered theories.”).
25. Id.
26. See Leslie Stephens, Virtue-Based Ethical Systems, in ETHICAL THEORY,
supra note 20, at 317, 317 (“Whereas action-oriented ethics emphasizes doing,
virtue- or agent-based ethics emphasizes being—being a certain type of person
who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or nonactions.”).
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difference is that virtue ethics is focused directly on character
development, and as such it does not approach each ethical
quandary in isolation, from “moment to moment.” 27 Rather,
“virtue ethics looks down the road to what a human life should
be, life as a whole.” 28
Of course, the focus on “being” has obvious repercussions
when it comes to action, for those who have cultivated a character
of “being” good and virtuous are more likely to act in ways that
are good and virtuous. 29 But action is not the primary concern of
virtue ethicists. End results are not the focus inasmuch as how
one gets to the end result.
In virtue ethics, the “how” is by means of character and
virtue. 30 To virtue ethicists, one ought to live life “excellently,”
which, in turn, will further the individual’s, and society’s,
happiness and well-being. 31 Indeed, the classical ethicists on
whose shoulders modern virtue ethicists stand, endeavored to
answer the question: “What is a good life for a human being?”; 32
not the more direct and mundane question: “What ought I to do?”
And to the classical philosophers, a good life for a human
being is a virtuous life. 33 But that, of course, begs the questions:
What is a “virtuous life”? What are “virtues”? Philippa Foot
captured the general understanding well when she wrote that
“‘virtues are in general beneficial characteristics, and indeed ones
that a human being needs to have, for his own sake and that of
his fellows.’” 34 As David Norton explained more recently, “In the
27. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 56 (“Utilitarianism and Kant, the main
alternatives, focus on getting the actions right and so focus on the moments that
make up your life rather than the bigger picture.”).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 55 (“It’s not that virtue theorists don’t care what actions are
performed; it’s that they think getting the person right is the most important
thing, and once you’ve done this, good actions will follow automatically.”).
30. See id. at 58 (“The virtues are the means and the end.”).
31. See Stephens, supra note 26, at 318 (“The aretaic concept of teleology
focuses . . . on the goal of life—living well and achieving excellence.”).
32. See David L. Norton, Moral Minimalism and the Development of Moral
Character, in XIII MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 21, at 180, 182.
33. See id.
34. PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 3 (1978), quoted in Robert M. Adams, Common Projects and Moral
Virtue, in XIII MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 21, at 297, 302.
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classical understanding the virtues are excellences of character
that are objective goods, of worth to others as well as to the
virtues-bearer . . . .” 35 These two summaries underscore the more
communal orientation of virtue ethics versus other ethical
traditions. 36 For an excellent individual is understood to make an
excellent neighbor as well.
A seminal tract on virtue ethics is Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics. 37 Hailing from the fourth century B.C., Nicomachean
Ethics posits that “eudaimonia” (best translated as authentic
flourishing, as opposed to mere transient pleasure or satisfaction)
requires virtue as its predicate. 38 And since Aristotle famously
observed that man is a social animal, 39 virtue is not simply a
matter of individual concern, but rather a concern of society as a
whole. As indicated, an individual’s excellence (or lack thereof)
usually has repercussions for all those around her. 40 In the
parlance of modern economics, one could say that an individual’s
35. Norton, supra note 32, at 181.
36. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 56. For an extended discussion on the
nature of virtues, see SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 191–98.
37. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Roger Crisp ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000); see also Stephens, supra note 26, at 318 (discussing
Aristotle’s conception of virtue). Although virtue ethics traces its roots back to
ancient Greece, its focus on “being” as opposed to “doing” or “having” resonates
with Eastern traditions as well. See E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL:
ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 59 (Harper Perennial 1973) (“[T]he Buddhist
sees the essence of civilisation not in a multiplication of wants but in the
purification of human character.”).
38. See Stephens, supra note 26, at 318 (“The virtues are to be sought as
the best guarantee to the happy life.”). Some may “dismiss Aristotle as ignorant
of and irrelevant to the contemporary business world.” See SOLOMON, supra note
21, at 18 (noting the tendency of some to do this). In response, I second Robert
Solomon who wrote that this would be a “mistake,” for Aristotle “anticipated,
centuries before there were investment bankers, bond traders, Fannie or Ginnie
Maes, the source of some of the worst ills of our economy.” Id. Indeed, Aristotle
could be called “the first (known) business ethicist.” Id. at 101.
39. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 4 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publishing Co.
1998) (stating “a human being is by nature a political animal”). Indeed,
“[h]umans cannot develop themselves intellectually, culturally, and morally
without cooperative association with other humans.” Richard J. Regan, Virtue,
Religion, and Civic Culture, in XIII MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, supra note
21, at 342–43; see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 26–27 (“[A] [h]omo sapien[ ]
deprived of a community and a culture is a pathetic, virtually helpless animal.”).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36 (discussing the communal
nature of virtue ethics).
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private morality imposes very public externalities—indirectly if
not directly.
Citizens who lack virtue undermine not only their own
happiness but that of their communities as well (ranging from
their immediate family to their local community and beyond). For
this reason, the identification of what exactly constitutes virtue
ordinarily (and arguably must) take into account the social
dimension of human existence. 41
The correctness of Aristotle’s insight here is difficult to deny.
Imagine a father who lacks the virtue of temperance, or selfcontrol. 42 Perhaps this shortcoming exhibits itself most obviously
when it comes to the consumption of alcohol. Such a shortcoming
could readily cause the father to alienate friends and family and
perhaps neglect his children. This certainly takes its toll on all
parties involved. If the father falls ill or loses his job, he further
harms his immediate family, perhaps burdens his extended
family, and is likely to draw upon the resources of his fellow
citizens.
This still poses another question: What are those traits and
habits that contribute to eudemonia? Or, put differently, how
exactly are the virtues to be identified? Four that have stood the
test of time are set forth in Plato’s Republic: wisdom, courage,
temperance, and justice. 43 Aristotle expanded upon this list,
identifying as virtues: courage, friendliness, temperance,
truthfulness, liberality, wittiness, magnificence, shame, pride,
justice, good temper, and honor. 44 Contrary, perhaps, to the
41. See Robert Merrihew Adams, Common Projects and Moral Virtue, in 13
MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 297, 300 (Peter French et al. eds., Univ. of
Notre Dame Press 1988) (“Thus human good is found largely in activities whose
point and value depend on the participation of other people in a common
project.”).
42. Temperance is one of the original moral virtues Plato expounds in The
Republic. See David L. Norton, Moral Minimalism and the Development of
Moral Character, in 13 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 180, 181 (Peter French
et al. eds., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1988) (introducing the virtues of classical
morality through Socrates as depicted in Plato’s Republic).
43. See id. (applying the classical virtues to people in modern times);
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. IV, at 89–115, 103 (Paul Negri & Joslyn T. Pine eds.,
Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover Publ’ns 2d ed. 2000) (c. 399 B.C.E.) (discussing
the four virtues of the governing state—wisdom, courage, temperance, and
justice—and applying them to the individual).
44. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 200 (citations omitted).
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clarion cry of Barry Goldwater, 45 Aristotle famously exhorted
moderation, asserting that virtue was often found in the “golden
mean” between the vices of excess and deficiency. 46 (Thus, the
virtue of “courage” is the mean between “cowardice” and
“rashness.”) 47
Aristotle posited that virtues can be derived from reason
when one considers the nature of humanity and society. 48 “A
virtue is a trait that helps one to fit into and contribute to
society.” 49 This, in turn, leads to both the individual—and
society’s—flourishing. Thus, those habits that contribute to
eudemonia (flourishing) are the seeds of virtue, and those that
undermine eudemonia are virtue’s opposite (vice). 50

45. See Barry Goldwater, Sen., The Republican National Convention,
Acceptance Address (July 16, 1964), in The Republican National Convention,
Acceptance Address, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY (Vital Speeches of the Day,
Phoenix, Ariz.), Aug. 15, 1964, at 642, 644, available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2012) (“I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.
And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no
virtue!”).
46. See STEWART, supra note 22, at 61 (explaining Aristotle’s doctrine of the
golden mean).
47. Id. For a full list of the virtues Aristotle identified, see id. at 73–74. The
task of identifying virtues is further aided by the recognition of certain general
themes and understandings that have emerged in human societies across
continents and ages. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 169–89 (Univ. of
Notre Dame Press 1981) (discussing the nature and metaphysics of virtues and
their relationship to social order).
48. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian
Approach, in 13 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 32, 33 (Peter French et al. eds.,
Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1988) (describing Aristotle’s account of human
flourishing as justifiable with reference to reasons that derive from “features of
humanness” in conjunction with local traditions); see also Philippa Foot,
VIRTUES AND VICES 1–18 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (remarking about moral
virtue and its effect on society).
49. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 107.
50. See Conly, supra note 21, at 86 (discussing how to evaluate character
based on virtues). Aristotle conceived of human flourishing as possessing virtues
relevant to the human function, which is to reason. See id. at 86–87 (describing
Aristotle’s conception of flourishing as evaluating the function of a thing to
determine whether it is a good thing, such as the human capacity to reason).
Modern virtue ethicists generally adopt a broader approach and admit a greater
variety of activities, concerns, and interests as potentially constitutive elements
of human flourishing.
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As important as it is to identify virtue and its significance, it
is also critically important to come to an understanding of how
virtue is developed. Aristotle wrote that moral virtue cannot be
acquired via instruction alone but rather needed to be developed
through choice and action. 51 Indeed, virtue has been commonly
defined as the “habit” of doing good, 52 and habits are learned via
repeated doing. This comports well with common experience.
Countless individuals know what they ought to do yet fail to
actually do it. The gulf between knowledge and willpower can be
wide, and a person of virtue is someone who has effectively
bridged that gulf. To take the analogy one step further, the bridge
is built by repeatedly acting in accord with one’s conscience.
Conversely, the bridge is damaged each time an individual
ignores the dictates of conscience and chooses instead to act at
odds with what she believes to be right. 53
As shall be explained, virtue ethicists have differed with
respect to the role that coercion plays in the development of
virtue. 54 There is universal agreement, however, that repeated
voluntary action can lead to the development of virtue. 55
Moreover, I believe it is fair to go one step further and hold that a
51. See STEPHENS, supra note 26, at 318 (explaining Aristotle’s view that
“moral [virtues] must be lived in order to be learned” and not merely taught).
52. See id. (“By living well we acquire the right habits. These habits are in
fact the virtues.”).
53. See XXII THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA 67–95 (Anthony Kenny
trans., Blackfriars 1964) (describing how dispositions, including virtues, are
formed and destroyed according to a person’s actions and choices). Virtues are
often deemed to be interrelated and mutually reinforcing. See XXIII THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA 55–67 (W.D. Hughes trans., Blackfriars 1969)
(stating that moral virtues and habits tending toward good deeds are
connected); DANIEL J. SULLIVAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 150–51 (Bruce
Publ’g Co. 1957) (discussing how to live a virtuous life); see also Lawrence
Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology, in 1 REVIEW OF
CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 383, 387 (Martin L. Hoffman & Lois Wladis
Hoffman eds., Russel Sage Found. 1964) (interpreting findings of studies as
supporting “common views of moral character as a set of general ‘good habits’ or
as a ‘strong conscience’”). But see SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 259 (“The
Aristotel[i]an thesis of the unity of virtues . . . that, if one (truly) has one virtue,
he or she will have all of them . . . [is] just plain false.”).
54. See infra Part III.B.
55. See infra text accompanying note 112 (“[A]ll [virtue ethicists] accept the
notion that decisions voluntarily made move an individual farther along the
path of virtue.”).
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consensus exists for the proposition that the more voluntary one’s
choice of action is, the more effectively it will promote the
development of one’s virtue. 56
In light of the preceding, the importance of virtue ethics to
corporate law is difficult to miss. Because “man is a social
animal,” 57 it comes as no surprise that “human good is found very
largely in activities whose point and value depend on the
participation of other people in a common project.” 58 And such
activities, even when economically based, are still rich in
interactions that could test, develop, or undermine virtue. 59 This
speaks directly to human activity within the corporation. To limit
the analysis of such activity to merely the economic incentives
entailed, or to the limitations imposed by rules and regulations,
blinds one to an entire dimension of reality. Through such
activity, individuals not only earn a living, but also (and, perhaps
more importantly) learn, exercise, and develop the virtues that
will constitute their very character. 60
Every system of ethics has its detractors, and virtue ethics is
no exception. 61 As this Article is not a piece of philosophy per se
(rather it merely seeks to utilize and apply, without unnecessary
addition or subtraction, a preexisting philosophical system), I will
not launch into a full-fledged apologia for virtue ethics. I will,
however, borrow Robert Solomon’s description of the approach as
indicative of why I find virtue ethics normatively attractive:
56.
57.
58.

See infra Part III.B.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 39.
Robert Merrihew Adams, Common Projects and Moral Virtue, in 13
MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 297, 300 (Peter French et al. eds., Univ. of
Notre Dame Press 1988).
59. See id. at 301 (“[O]ne must be more than an economic benefactor if one
is to be humanly good to one’s associates.”).
60. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 104 (“We talk about ‘making a living’ as
if it is primarily a matter of income, but the truth is that the living we make has
as much to do with life and meaning as it does with paying the rent.”).
61. See, e.g., William Frankena, A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethical
Systems, in ETHICAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 334–39 (arguing against the
virtue-ethics notion that moral virtues alone form the basis of moral life); Robert
Louden, Some Vices of Virtue Ethics, in ETHICAL THEORY, supra note 20, at 347–
56 (arguing against the virtue-ethics approach as providing no resolution for
ethical dilemmas and arguing that some principles must exist without moral
virtues).
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The bottom line of the Aristotelean [virtue ethics] approach to
business ethics is that we have to get away from “bottom line”
thinking and conceive of business as an essential part of the
good life, living well, getting along with others, having a sense
of self-respect, and being part of something one can be proud
of. 62

I would also like to anticipate and briefly respond to what
may be the most common objection to virtue ethics and its
application: the notion that certain conduct is objectively “good”
or “bad” and that we are capable of accurately identifying it as
such. 63 For this notion has indeed been a traditional component of
virtue-ethics thinking. 64
As an initial matter, Robert George, a modern and prominent
virtue ethicist, has proffered a vision of virtue ethics with
softened objective edges. 65 George criticizes Aristotle and Aquinas
for overly objectivizing and for positing too narrow a view of what
constitutes the “good.” 66 As George puts it:
Without adopting the relativistic view which sees the good as
so radically diverse that whatever people happen to want is
good, we can and should recognize a multiplicity of basic
human goods and a multiplicity of ways that different people
(and communities) can pursue and organize instantiations of
those goods in living valuable and morally upright lives. . . .
There is no single pattern anyone can identify as the proper
model of a human life, not because there is no such thing as
good and bad, but because there are many goods. Moreover,
people are fulfilled in part by deliberating and choosing for
themselves a pattern of their own. Practical reasoning is not
merely a human capacity; it is itself a fundamental aspect of
human well-being and fulfillment: a basic dimension of the
human good consists precisely in bringing reason to bear in

62. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 104.
63. See id. at 114–15 (offering the utilitarian criticism of virtue ethics that
calculating and comparing the harm of actions is difficult).
64. See ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL 38–39 (Oxford Univ. Press
1993) (criticizing Aristotle for failing to recognize a “multiplicity of ways that
different people (and communities) can pursue . . . those goods”).
65. See id. (stating that we should “recognize a multiplicity of basic human
goods”).
66. See id. at 38–41 (arguing against Aristotle’s view of one superior good).
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deliberating and choosing among competing
possibilities, commitments, and ways of life. 67

valuable

In other words, what causes one person to flourish can very
well differ from what causes another to flourish. 68 This loosens, to
a significant degree, the objective strictures put into place by
Aristotle and Aquinas. Nonetheless, as George repeatedly makes
clear, virtue ethicists generally maintain that there are indeed
objectively “good” and “bad” ways of living. 69 “Whatever
happiness may be, and however it differs from person to person,
there are certain essential if variable personal ingredients that
are required,” 70 and these certain essential ingredients are
exactly what we call virtues.
Many if not most people, I believe, can subscribe to this “least
common denominator” approach to morally good conduct, as
human experience appears to attest. For all our diversity as
human beings, what men and women across time and continents
appear to have in common appears greater (to this author at
least) than what divides them. Reason would dictate that certain
choices and arrangements would be conducive to human
flourishing, whereas others would be counterproductive. Not
surprisingly, therefore, there has been wide agreement across
cultures and ages as to certain very basic moral precepts. 71
Aristotle, and to an extent Plato, seemed to capture these
common precepts in their list of virtues. 72 It is difficult to imagine
too much disagreement with these lists, regardless of one’s
67. Id. at 38–39.
68. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 106 (“Happiness is a large, ill-defined
notion.”).
69. See GEORGE, supra note 64, at 38 (discussing the multiplicity of goods).
70. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 107.
71. See C.S. LEWIS, ABOLITION OF MAN 51–61 (MacMillan 1947) (listing
moral laws and duties of numerous cultures and nations); George Bragues, The
Ancients Against the Moderns: Focusing on the Character of Corporate Leaders,
78 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 383 (2008) (setting forth Benjamin Franklin’s recognition
of moderation, sincerity, resolution, and justice, among others, as virtues);
Linda M. Sama & Victoria Shoaf, Reconciling Rules and Principles: An EthicsBased Approach to Corporate Governance, 58 J. BUS. ETHICS 177, 183 (2005)
(identifying truth, honesty, and fairness as global “hypernorms”). That said,
specific instantiations of these precepts have diverged—sometimes quite widely.
See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 196–97 (providing examples of topics eliciting
differing attitudes among cultures).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 43–44 (listing the classical virtues).
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ethical preferences, and if someone could merely credit these
habits of character as “good,” one could readily overcome the
quandary of having to identify “good” versus “bad” generally or on
other levels.
Yet we might be able to prescind even from this level of
moral absolutism without abandoning the use of virtue ethics
entirely. For one could import from the virtue-ethics tradition the
core component that an individual be true to herself—that she
live a life in accord with whatever she deems to be good and just.
And “[w]hile philosophers have been unable to agree upon any
ultimate principle of the good which would define ‘correct’ moral
judgments, most philosophers agree upon the characteristics
which make a judgment a genuine moral judgment.” 73 Thus, to
the extent that individuals are in possession of certain values,
whatever values those may be, one could argue (from a virtueethics perspective) that such individual’s personal fulfillment and
development requires a life lived in consistency with those
values—in consistency with moral judgments made within the
context of corporate employment.
III. Virtue and the Limits of Law
Although virtue ethics focuses only indirectly on “end
results,” 74 the end results of virtue ethics are certainly not
something to ignore. As already argued, virtue would have served
as a check on the widespread nonfeasance and malfeasance that
marked our most recent financial crisis. 75 Moreover, even if
corporate actors could be expected to comport themselves with
the law (and their duties as defined thereunder), there is only so
much that can be legislated. Law has its limits, both practically
and prudentially, and virtue serves to fill the law’s gaps. 76
73. Lawrence Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and Moral
Ideology, in 1 REVIEW OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 383, 405 (Martin L.
Hoffman & Lois Wladis Hoffman eds., Russel Sage Found. 1964) (citations
omitted).
74. Supra Part II.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 4–6 (discussing virtue as it pertains
to nonfeasance and malfeasance).
76. See Yankah, supra note 7, at 1210 (concluding that “human beings
aspire to more than to fulfill even their most stringent moral duties; human
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A. The Inadequacy of Regulatory Solutions
Financial crises and scandals in the United States are almost
invariably met with a regulatory response. 77 Such responses have
obviously failed to prevent crises from reoccurring. Indeed, the
most one could realistically hope for is that new layers of
regulation will prevent repeats of precisely the very same crises.
Put differently, legislative and regulatory responses are generally
reactionary 78 and tend largely to address the repercussions of
yesterday’s conduct; they cannot hope (and rarely even try) to
foresee the countless unknowable problems of tomorrow. 79
This is a significant and nearly universal limitation to
regulatory solutions. Even the wisest of regulators cannot, with
perfect accuracy, anticipate the future, which makes it
exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to implement policies
capable of addressing every conceivable future problem or
wrongdoing.
Virtue, however, is capable of exerting its influence beyond
regulation’s outer limits. Virtue is capable of restraining the
individual from exploiting a loophole that he or she discovers in
the law—a loophole that would cause the individual’s misconduct
to evade detection and/or punishment. In short, virtue protects
society where law cannot. 80
beings . . . aim at full and flourishing lives”). “Ethics completes the law in that
promotion of the general good and avoidance of harm to others are seen as the
overall purposes of law.” Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 59. As James
Madison argued: “No theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us
secure. To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness
without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.” James Madison, Member,
Fed. Convention, Remarks During the Virginia Debate on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution (June 2, 1788), in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED
BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 531, 537 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 2d ed. 1891).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10 (mentioning the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act and the Dodd–Frank Act).
78. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 50 (“The law focuses on
regulating yesterday’s problems while the fertile brains of corporate managers
are already moving into new areas.”).
79. See id. at 58 (“The law continually regulates yesterday’s business
abuses.”).
80. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 106 (“Whereas some organizations have
published codes of ethics . . . to help guide behavior (or counter unethical
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And by “law” I am referring not only to actual legislation and
regulatory rulemaking but to all external restraints on one’s
activity. Consider the distinction between an organization that
has a code of ethics imposed upon its employees and an
organization that has a code of ethics internalized by its
employees. Corporations falling within the former camp are
described by R.E. Reidenbach and D.P. Robin as “legalistic
corporation[s]” 81 and are simply one step removed from the lowest
of five stages of corporate moral development (the “[a]moral
[o]rganization”). 82 Such corporations can be expected to comply
with the letter of their ethical codes—but not with their spirit. 83
Indeed, employees oftentimes work very hard at finding a way to
do something that clearly violates the spirit of code, rule, or law,
behavior) . . . in all organizations, the ultimate test is the strength of an
individual employee’s personal ethical framework.”); Edward Peter Stringham,
Embracing Morals in Economics: The Role of Internal Moral Constraints in a
Market Economy, J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. (forthcoming), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1748635 (asserting the important role of internal moral
constraints on individual behavior). See generally Gustavo Grullon et al.,
Religion, Ethics, and Corporate Behavior (Sept. 8, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.bauer.uh.edu/departments/finance/
documents/Religion.pdf (examining the influence of religion on corporate
behavior); Sean T. McGuire et al., The Impact of Religion on Financial
Reporting Irregularities, ACCT. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1909278 (same).
Although religion and virtue are two distinct phenomena, both religion and
virtue are characterized by certain personal commitments of belief and/or
behavior. I refer to these studies in support of the general proposition that such
personal commitments—whatever their source—do indeed significantly serve to
affect behavior, even within the corporate context. See generally id.; McGuire,
supra. A particularly trenchant line of criticism to this proposition is the
assertion that character is largely situational, and thus “virtue” is not a
phenomenon that transcends particularized contexts. See, e.g., Gilbert Harman,
No Character or Personality, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 87, 89−90 (2003) (explaining
that “‘correspondence bias’ or ‘the fundamental attribution error’” occurs when
there “is a bias toward explanations in terms of corresponding personality
traits” which results in “the error of ignoring situational factors”).
81. See R. Eric Reidenbach & Donald P. Robin, A Conceptual Model of
Corporate Moral Development, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 273, 276 (1991) (stating that
the “legalistic corporation” requires “obedience to laws, codes, and regulations”).
82. See id. at 282 (summarizing the five stages of the moral development of
corporations).
83. See id. at 276 (“[T]he legalistic corporation [is] so named because of the
preoccupation the corporation exhibits for compliance with the letter of the law
as opposed to the spirit of the law.”).
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while at the same time just barely satisfying its most narrow
reading.
Additionally, even if law could possibly foresee and address
every possible future wrongdoing, we may not want it to. On a
practical level, there is the question of resources and expense.
There is the difficulty of crafting such potentially expansive
regulation in a way to effectively retard the bad without unduly
burdening the good. Thus, even if our regulators were omniscient,
they would still not be omnipotent.
Further still, there may be prudential reasons to refrain from
legislating against everything that could be conceivably legislated
against. At its extreme, financial regulation could approach the
equivalent of a police officer on every corner—a state of affairs
inconsistent with a society that considers itself free.
Most fundamentally of all, legal and regulatory solutions to
“the crisis” largely address its symptoms, not its underlying
causes. Just because law or regulation enables something to be
done, and even though economic incentives may encourage
something to be done, does not mean that it should or must be
done. “Overleveraging,” to take one example, is merely a
symptom of imprudence, if not greed. Imprudence, then, is a root
cause of the crisis—overleveraging would simply be one of its
manifestations. Opposing the vice of imprudence is the virtue of
“prudence.” A prudent individual would not borrow to his or her
legal limits in order to maximize potential investment returns (or
ability to consume), but would rather carefully and seriously
weigh these rewards against potential risks. The inculcation of
prudence would serve as a bulwark against overleveraging, and
against all other problems and misconduct associated with
imprudence.
Finally, there is reason to believe that, at a certain point, law
undermines trust. Many theorists have pointed to trust as
foundational to the success of the market economy (if not society
as a whole). 84 This provides a further limitation on the
84. See Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation,
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 829, 830 (2010) (“Trust is a critical, if not the critical,
ingredient to the success of the capital markets (and of the free market economy
in general).”). Interestingly and unexpectedly, this conclusion was largely
endorsed by a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. See Tom
O’Gorman, Christianity the Reason for West’s Success, Say the Chinese, (Mar. 3,
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desirability of regulatory solutions to the financial crisis. As I
have argued elsewhere, by rigorously circumscribing conduct, law
limits the ability of individuals to prove their trustworthiness, to
the detriment of both the economy and to society as a whole. 85
B. Can Law Make Men Moral?
Given the preceding, an objective of corporate law (from a
virtue-ethics perspective, at least) ought to be the development
and exercise of virtue within the corporation for the benefit of the
common good. 86 However, there is yet another way in which law
is arguably limited, a way that is wholly different than that just
described. Law is limited in its ability to make people virtuous. 87
2011), http://www.ionainstitute.ie/index.php?id=1336 (last visited Jan. 30, 2012)
(“‘The Christian moral foundation of social and cultural life was what made
possible the emergence of capitalism and then the successful transition to
democratic politics [due to the trust it engendered]. We don’t have any doubt
about this.’” (quoting a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
85. See Colombo, supra note 84, at 850 (“By limiting the opportunities to
take advantage of another (via rules or regulations that prevent misconduct,
make misconduct unlawful, or otherwise subject misconduct to sanctions), law
and regulation limit the ability of individuals and institutions to demonstrate
their trustworthiness.”).
86. See XXIII THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA 129–33 (Edmund Hill
trans., Blackfriars 1964); cf. REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW 18 (2004) (“[T]he overall objective of corporate law—as of any
branch of law—is presumably to serve the interests of society as a whole.”). Of
course, there are those who object to imputing any morality to an organization.
See, e.g., Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Matthews, Jr., Can a Corporation
Have a Conscience? 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 132, 133 (1982) (“‘It is improper to
expect organizational conduct to conform to the ordinary principles of
morality . . . . We cannot and must not expect formal organizations, or their
representatives acting in their official capacities, to be honest, courageous,
considerate, sympathetic, or to have any kind of moral integrity.’” (quoting John
Ladd)). But see id. (“Organizational agents such as corporations should be no
more and no less morally responsible . . . than ordinary persons.”). See generally
PETER A. FRENCH, CORPORATE ETHICS (1995) (finding that corporations can be
moral agents); Geoff Moore, Corporate Moral Agency: Review and Implications,
21 J. BUS. ETHICS 329 (1999) (arguing that corporations should be morally
responsible). I shall prescind from this debate because it is not directly
applicable to my project; the focus of this Article is on the virtue of individuals
within the corporation enterprise, despite my use of the term “corporate virtue”
to refer to this.
87. See GEORGE, supra note 64, at 1 (“Laws cannot make men moral.”).
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According to some modern virtue ethicists, the development of
virtue requires liberty of action—the ability to choose ill in
addition to choosing good. 88 The coercive power of law is largely
at odds with this important voluntary dynamic, thereby
frustrating the development of virtue.
This position is best articulated by Robert George, who has
argued that: “[m]orality . . . is, above all an internal matter, a
matter of rectitude in choosing: one becomes morally good
precisely, and only, by doing the right thing for the right
reason.” 89 If, conversely, one conducts himself or herself
appropriately out of fear of legal sanction, all that is achieved is
“outward conformity with what morality requires,” via an appeal
to “subrational motives.” 90
George’s philosophical argument receives support from the
social sciences, which have found that “direct training and
physical types of punishment may be effective in producing shortrun situational conformity but do not directly produce general
internalized habits of moral character . . . carried into permissive
situations.” 91 This would appear to comport with common
experience. Do we consider “virtuous” the individual who does not
steal in the presence of a security guard, or instead the individual
who does not steal in the absence of a security guard? Indeed, for
any action to have moral worth, it must be voluntary—this is a
concept attested to not only by philosophers, 92 but even by our
laws. 93 Contracts signed under duress are unenforceable, as they
are not considered the product of free will. 94 Culpability for
88. See id. at 25 (“[M]orality. . . is a reflexive good, namely, a good that is
(and can only be) realized in choosing uprightly, reasonably, well; a good into
whose very definition choice enters.”).
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. See Kohlberg, supra note 53, at 389 (in the context of research into
children’s moral development).
92. See II THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA, 83–95 (Timothy
McDermott trans., Blackfriars 1964).
93. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 178 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining
that the voluntary requirement for moral wrongdoing is upheld through the
mens rea requirement in law which permits “those who offend without
carelessness, unwittingly, or in conditions in which they lacked the bodily or
mental capacity to conform to the law” to “be excused”).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174–75 (1981) (describing
that duress by physical compulsion prevents contract formation and duress by

24

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2012)

homicide increases with intentionality, and the “criminally
insane” (namely, those deprived of reason and therefore unable to
exercise moral judgment) can be deemed “not guilty.” 95
Whether one’s actions in the face of legal circumscription and
high probability of sanction are voluntary or not is an interesting
philosophical question in its own right, but it cannot be denied
that actions within such a context are certainly “less voluntary”
than actions in contexts where negative repercussions are
unlikely. Thus, although law and regulation can do a good job of
compelling people to mimic virtuous behavior, they do a poor job
(according to George) of directly making people virtuous. 96
threat make a contract voidable); 28 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 71:8 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that when “a party is compelled by physical force
to do an act that he has no intention of doing” he is under duress and “there is
no contract at all, or a ‘void contract’”).
95. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1(a) (2d ed.
2003) (stating that the insanity defense may be applied if when the act was
done, due to mental illness, defendant did not “know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing” or if he did know what he was doing, he did not know it
was wrong); 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 498 (4th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2011) (stating that a defendant can
use the insanity defense if due to “‘severe’ mental disease or defect” the
defendant was unable “to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness
of his acts” (citation omitted)).
96. See GEORGE, supra note 64, at 44 (“Laws can compel outward behavior,
not internal acts of the will; therefore, they cannot compel people to realize
moral goods. They cannot, in any direct sense, ‘make men moral.’”). The
qualifier “directly” is an important one, for George concedes the important role
that law plays in fashioning an environment suitable for the development of
virtue. See id. at 44−45 (“By suppressing industries and institutions that cater
to moral weakness, and whose presence in the moral environment makes it
difficult for people to choose uprightly, such laws can protect people from strong
temptations and inducements to vice.”). Additionally, it should be noted that
getting people to “mimic” virtuous behavior is not an altogether terrible
objective. If individuals prescind from wrongdoing, that is in itself a good thing,
and contributes to the common good, regardless of the reason. As such, the law
is rightly concerned with encouraging appropriate behavior. See id. at 46 (“A
morals law may prevent moral harm, thus benefitting a potential wrongdoer,
simply by protecting him from the (further) corrupting impact of acting out the
vice.”). But this, according to George, should not be confused with the
development of virtue. See id. at 44 (stating that laws cannot “make men moral”
directly). Unfortunately, the term “morality” itself has multiple definitions. I
would suggest that its first definition (“conformity to the rules of right conduct”)
is that which applies to the traditional understanding of law’s role with respect
to morality. WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 930 (1989). When I speak of “virtue” and “morality” throughout this
Article, I am referring to the third definition of morality: “moral quality or

TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE

25

George’s position would seem to conflict with a long tradition
within virtue ethics which has been much more optimistic about
law’s efficacy in creating virtue. In ancient Greece, “Plato had his
guardians, and Aristotle his project of comprehensive laws to
make Athenians good.” 97 There was a sense that coerced
habituation could pave the way for internalization, voluntary
choice, and genuine virtue. 98 What might first be done for base
motives (to avoid pain or experience pleasure, as per the law),
will, hopefully, if accompanied by proper moral training, blossom
into doing “virtuous acts for their own sake.” 99 George has shifted
law’s role in the development of virtue from the forefront to the
foreground. In doing so, he has arguably built upon the work of
the twentieth-century philosopher Jacques Maritain, who
forcefully advocated the principle of “subsidiarity”: the concept
that “the state should do for its citizens only what citizens and
voluntary associations of citizens are unable or failing to do for
themselves.” 100 One of the points of this is to afford individuals
and private institutions the space needed to develop and pursue
virtue. 101 As such, the subsidiarity principle is at odds with both
the proponents of statism and laissez-faire government:
Against those who would have the state organize every facet of
human society (or permit it to do so), [Maritain] argued that
other units beside the state promote, and should be allowed to
promote, the common good according to their own structures.
character.” Id.
97. Regan, supra note 39, at 344. To Aristotle “[a]rgument can merely
inform people of the right thing to do; it cannot motivate them to do it.” GEORGE,
supra note 64, at 23, as reprinted in VIRTUE JURISPRUDENCE 24, 27 (Colin
Farrelly & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2008). For this reason, Aristotle thought
that law would be necessary to give “some tincture of virtue” to those who would
otherwise be without virtue. Id. (citation omitted). Plato was even less forgiving:
he posited that a tightly-controlled regime of education, training, and control
was necessary to forge virtuous individuals. See PLATO, supra note 43, at 56−88
(explaining the proper method of education in the ideal city).
98. See Ralph F. Gaebler, On the Incompatibility of Political Virtue and
Judicial Review: A Neo-Aristotelean Perspective, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 263, 284
(2011) (stating that habituation causes students to perform “virtuous acts for
their own sake”).
99. Id.
100. Regan, supra note 39, at 345.
101. See id. (“The principle of subsidiarity assigns only a limited role to the
state in the development of a civic culture conducive to moral virtue.”).
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On the other hand, against those who would limit the state to
peace-keeping functions in human society, they argued that
the state is specifically charged with the task of promoting the
common good, that it is hierarchically supreme over other
social groups, and that it is responsible for ordering the
activities of the latter to the common good. In other words, the
state and the machinery of state exist to supplement and
foster, not to supplant or hinder, the self-development of
citizens through individual effort and voluntary associations
with others. 102

The importance of the development in philosophical thought
that George represents is difficult to underestimate. Indeed, it
calls into question much of the traditional Western
understanding regarding the function of law. 103 It also touches
upon a fundamental question of human nature: are people
inherently disposed toward virtue, or inherently disposed toward
vice? 104
This Article is certainly not going to resolve these weighty
questions. But given their importance to issues at hand, a
position must be taken before proceeding. To me, at least, the
most convincing words written on this subject are those of
Thomas Aquinas, whose approach falls somewhere between those
of Aristotle’s and George’s.
Aquinas makes a simple, critical, yet seemingly obvious
observation: 105 people differ from one another when it comes to
102. Regan, supra note 39, at 345.
103. As was well articulated in Montesquieu’s highly influential Spirit of
Laws. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
341, 350 (2009) (“At the heart of the republican tradition is a belief in the
critical importance of some kind of civic virtue and the impossibility of a publicserving government without it.”). See generally Matthew P. Bergman,
Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of the American
Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1990).
104. Compare IX THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIA 247–51 (Kenelm
Foster trans., Blackfriars 1968), with THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63
(Prometheus Books 1988) (explaining that in the natural condition “if any two
men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they
become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally their owne
conservation, and sometimes their delectation only), endeavour to destroy, or
subdue one another”). Aristotle falls in between Aquinas and Hobbes, holding
that “[h]uman beings are blank slates . . . with the capacity to receive either
virtue or vice.” Gaebler, supra note 98, at 282. Modern science appears to
vindicate Aquinas’s position. See generally MORAL MARKETS (Paul Zak ed., 2008).
105. At least to someone who has raised multiple children.
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certain natural tendencies. 106 As for moral behavior, some
individuals are inclined, by nature, towards acts of virtue, and
other individuals are inclined, by nature, towards acts of vice. 107
Not surprisingly, therefore, the effect of law upon these two
populations varies. “Men who are well disposed are led willingly
to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion, but men
who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are
compelled.” 108
Given that Aquinas concurs in the belief that the “purpose of
human law is to lead men to virtue,” 109 what is the wise
lawmaker to do in light of the natural variation that exists from
one human being to another? It would seem that he or she ought
to proceed very carefully, in order to avoid undermining the
development of virtue in those individuals naturally disposed to
virtue. And as for those individuals who are not so disposed,
Aquinas famously warns against setting the bar too high:
The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not
suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the
multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are
already virtuous, viz., that they should abstain from all evil.
Otherwise, these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such
precepts, would break out into yet greater evils. 110

Application of this thinking to corporate law would seem to
counsel in favor of a “light touch” approach with regard to the
promotion of virtuous conduct. For those corporate decision
makers already imbued with virtue, coercive measures could be
counterproductive. For those who are not so imbued, the law
should not demand standards of behavior to which only the truly
virtuous could readily conform. Instead, the law ought to
circumscribe only the more “grievous” manifestations of vice—
“from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly
those that are to the harm of others, without the prohibition of
which human society could not be maintained.” 111
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See AQUINAS, supra note 86, at 107–11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This light touch approach can also claim support from the
general virtue-ethics tradition insofar as a least common
denominator position can be distilled. For although only some
virtue ethicists admit the possibility of promoting virtue through
coercive habituation of good conduct, all accept the notion that
decisions voluntarily made move an individual further along the
path of virtue. 112
On a related note, general and substantial agreement can be
found for the proposition that, regardless of law’s questionable
efficacy in “coercing virtue,” law can certainly contribute to an
environment which fosters the development of virtue. 113 Thus, to
the extent that law makes it easier for individuals to develop
habits of doing good, 114 law facilitates the development of virtue.
Similarly, and just as significantly, law can create an
environment that undermines an individual’s ability to do good.
To the extent that law operates in such a manner, it impedes the
development of virtue.
Thus, law’s potential impotence to directly generate virtue
should not be misread as a sign of law’s irrelevance to the
question of virtue. For law plays a critical, even if indirect, role.
Law can create structures, institutions, expectations, and
possibly even norms that contribute mightily to virtue’s
development by making it easier to get virtue’s ball rolling. Laws
that dismantle and prevent conflicts of interest, for example, do a
good job in removing temptations—thus increasing the likelihood
that an individual will choose to do the right thing versus the
wrong thing. 115
112. See Gaebler, supra note 98, at 289–91 (“As a functional part of the
mechanics of virtue, deliberation is the distinctive feature of choice that
differentiates it from both wish and non-rational desire and, therefore, makes a
crucial contribution to the exercise of virtue and vice.” (emphasis added)).
113. See GEORGE, supra note 64, at 44−46 (“[M]oral laws can help to shape
the framework of understandings and expectations that helps to constitute the
moral environment of any community.”).
114. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that virtue has
been defined as “habit” of doing good and habits are developed through
repetition).
115. This was one of the solutions to last decade’s research analyst scandal,
which I commended. See Ronald J. Colombo, Buy, Sell or Hold?, 73 BROOK. L.
REV. 91, 118 (2007) (“Rule 2711 attempts to minimize the fundamental conflicts
of interest that give rise to research analyst misconduct via structural changes
and disclosure . . . .”).
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IV. Corporations and Virtue
Corporate law is not immune to the limitations and
shortcomings shared by all other fields of law. 116 Moreover, as
institutions
suffused
with
interpersonal
relationships,
corporations would appear to be ideal candidates for analysis
under the lens of virtue ethics (which, after all, is built largely
upon the proposition that human beings are social animals 117).
The moment for such an analysis is particularly ripe in light of
the recent financial crisis which, as discussed, laid bare corporate
decision-making processes seemingly bereft of the influences of
virtue. 118
Thus, there are at least two interrelated reasons why both
the virtue ethicist and the prudent policymaker should be quite
concerned with the moral ecology of the corporation: (i) for the
sake of the individuals who work within the corporation; and
(ii) for the sake of those individuals, institutions, and
communities that work with or are affected by corporate activity.
In other words, the degree to which virtue influences corporate
decision making is profoundly important to those on the inside of
the corporation, but also, in many cases, to those on the outside of
the corporation.
And concern for the moral ecology of the corporation is
buttressed by insights culled from virtue-ethics philosophy,
coupled with an acknowledgment of the limitations of law. The
former suggests the need for a virtue-conducive environment in
order to promote true human flourishing, and the latter reveals
the indispensability of virtue as law’s supplement when it comes
to preventing misconduct.
This suggests that it is critically important for the
corporation to be a virtue-enhancing, rather than a virtue-

116. See supra Part III.A. (explaining that laws are limited by the fact that
they are generally reactionary, deal with the effects of past conduct, and cannot
foresee the countless problems of the future).
117. See supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing Aristotle’s observation
that “man is a social animal”).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 1–8 (arguing that a lack of
character and virtue has played an important role in causing the recent
financial crisis).
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enervating, institution. Consequently, this should be one of the
primary ends of corporate law.
A. The Corporation as a Nexus of Contracts
Identifying the need for virtue’s inclusion in corporation
decision making (which I shall refer to as “corporate virtue”) is,
relatively speaking, the easy part. 119 As with so many things in
life, significantly more difficult is identifying the means for
achieving this particular end.
Past scholarship of mine argued that shareholders were
responsible for ensuring that their corporations were fulfilling all
requisite moral and ethical obligations. 120 This was predicated on
the traditional view that shareholders are the owners of the
corporation, and upon the Aristotelian notion that owners are
morally responsible for the ways in which their property is
used. 121
But the traditional view is not the prevailing view today.
Most corporate law scholars today do not think of the corporation
as a “thing” capable of being owned but rather as a mere “nexus
of contracts.” 122 Pursuant to this understanding, the corporation
119. The key term here being “relatively.” The concept that corporate law
should have anything to do with virtue is itself a controversial proposition, and
cuts against the prevailing trend that casts corporate law in purely economic
terms. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS
§ 1.5, at 26 (2002) (“It is fair to say that the economic theory of the firm is now
the dominant paradigm in corporate law.” (citation omitted)).
120. See Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional
and Progressive Corporate Law Via an Aristotelian Understanding of
Ownership, 34 J. CORP. L. 247, 266–67 (2008) (“[B]y maintaining the traditional
paradigm of the corporation . . . the shareholders’ moral obligations can fairly be
used to guide and circumscribe corporate activity.” (emphasis omitted)).
121. See id. at 249 (“[T]he traditional conceptualization of the corporation
(namely, that of a company owned by its shareholders) can be substantially
harmonized with the ends promoted by the ‘progressive’ approaches to corporate
law . . . made possible via recourse to an Aristotelian understanding of
ownership.”). Since management and oversight of the corporation is entrusted to
its board of directors, it is the board’s duty to exercise this moral responsibility
on behalf of the shareholders. See id. at 248–49. In response to the argument
that the shareholders and directors might embrace different moralities, the
Aristotelian philosophy asserts the objectivity of morality—a notion which, if
accepted, dispels the problem of potentially conflicting moralities. See id. at 272.
122. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, § 1.5, at 26. But see Julian Velasco,
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is a network of interconnected explicit and implicit contracts. 123
Within this conceptualization, the role of corporate law is to
promote efficiency by supplying the default rules that the various
corporate constituencies would have bargained for had they the
time and ability. 124 Thus, the ordering of rights and
responsibilities within the corporation is a function of the
strengths, interests, and vulnerabilities of the various parties to
the corporation. 125
Without distancing myself from my past scholarship, I
nevertheless wish to utilize the attorney’s prerogative to “argue
in the alternative.” I want to articulate a role for virtue within
the prevailing, modern understanding of both the corporation and
morality—within the context of contractarian thought. 126
As before, a major component of this undertaking involves
identifying the party or parties who should hold the responsibility
for exercising virtue on behalf of the corporation. In other words,
who within the corporation ought to be entrusted with the ability
to formulate and actualize corporate virtue?
Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 897 (2010)
(“[T]here seems to be substantial agreement among legal scholars . . . that
shareholders do not own corporations . . . [m]ost people—not just the public and
the media, but also politicians, and even bureaucrats and the courts—seem to
believe that shareholders do, in fact, own corporations.”).
123. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, § 1.5, at 27 (“[T]he firm is not a thing,
but rather a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights
and obligations among the various inputs making up the firm.”).
124. See id. at 28–29.
125. See id. at 30 (“The basic thesis of the hypothetical bargain methodology
is that by providing the rule to which the parties would agree if they could
bargain . . . , society facilitates private ordering.”).
126. Such an approach also has the benefit of addressing the problem of
anchoring corporate virtue to shareholders given the realities of the modern
shareholders—rationally apathetic and largely institutional. See Larry Ribstein,
The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019,
1022 (2011) (“[D]ispersed, passive, and anonymous shareholders that corporategovernance-based regulation purports to protect are unlikely to have much
expressive interest at stake in corporate activities.”). The contractarian
approach, however, contributes to the view that the corporation is a mere legal
fiction, which in turn obscures the applicability of ethics and the concerns I raise
from a virtue-ethics perspective. If instead, corporations are recognized to be
“communities” with “people working together for common goals,” an
appreciation of the roles of ethic and the importance of the individual within the
corporation, would, I suggest, flow more naturally. See SOLOMON, supra note 21,
at 109.
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The answer to this question informs the answer to another
important one: Whose virtue ought corporate law serve primarily
to foster? It makes little sense to entrust corporate virtue to a
constituency ill-formed in virtue. To the extent, therefore, that an
objective of corporate law is—or should be—to support a climate
of virtue within the corporation, it can most efficaciously do this
by supporting the virtue of those actors most capable of wielding
influence over questions of virtue within the corporation. Thus,
our immediate task is to identify those actors.
B. Corporate Constituencies and Virtue
Application of the contractarian theory of the corporation to
the question of virtue requires identification of the corporate
constituency (or constituencies) best suited to exercise virtue,
most interested in exercising virtue, and most vulnerable to
restrictions on or degradation of virtue vis-à-vis the corporation.
The universe of constituencies is generally thought to include:
•

Shareholders

•

Bondholders

•

Directors

•

Officers

•

Employees

•

Suppliers / business partners

•

Customers

•

The community/communities in which the corporations
operates. 127

The question of vulnerability requires us to ask: Which of the
corporation’s various constituencies is most exposed to suffering
the degradation of its virtue on account of corporate activity?
Closely related to this is the question of interest: Which of the
corporation’s various constituencies would be most interested in
exercising virtue on the corporation’s behalf? Taken together and
127. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250 (1999) (identifying the different entities
that are involved in the functioning of a corporation).
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put more simply: Who cares the most about whether a particular
corporation conducts itself in accordance with the dictates of
virtue?
Recall that virtue is largely about choice—specifically, about
how one makes the various decisions that one must make
throughout life. 128 The habit of choosing to do good when
confronted with these choices constitutes the development of
virtue; the habit of choosing to do bad constitutes the
development of vice. 129 An important factor that could influence
these choices, either positively or negatively, is the environment
in which they are made. 130
As such, it would seem that constituencies external to the
corporation would ordinarily be least vulnerable when it comes to
the safeguarding and development of the corporation’s virtue.
Consequently, these same constituencies would probably have the
least interest in commandeering the corporation to act in accord
with their understanding of virtue. Although this may seem
obvious, a few words of explanation and qualification are in order.
Within the contractarian understanding of the corporation,
the line between those who are “inside” versus those who are
“outside” the corporation is not particularly clear. 131 To the
contractarian, the corporation is not a “thing” that has welldefined borders, but rather a network of explicit and implicit
contracts. 132 That said, not all constituencies participate in the
network equally: some are at its center, others at its periphery;
some are critical players, others have a level of involvement that
is transient and fleeting. Regardless, I am using the term
“external” here in the colloquial sense—as those parties not
falling under the corporate umbrella. This would include the
community in which the corporation does business, the
128. See supra text accompanying notes 47–59 (explaining that virtue
developed by repeatedly engaging in virtuous actions and decisions).
129. See supra text accompanying note 52 (defining virtue as the habit
making the right decisions).
130. See supra text accompanying note 113 (stating that the enactment
laws can help facilitate an environment that promotes the development
virtue).
131. William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation:
Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 420 (1989).
132. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, § 1.5, at 26.
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corporation’s customers, and the corporation’s suppliers and
business partners. How to best categorize the corporation’s
investors (shareholders and bondholders) is less clear, but not
critical to the analysis for reasons discussed hereinafter. 133
External constituencies have less interest in corporate virtue
because the corporation does not ordinarily shape the moral
environment in which they live. A shopper who spends an hour at
Target is not defined by that experience because it is a rather
small part of his or her day, and an even smaller part of his or
her life overall. This contrasts dramatically with the situation of
Target’s employees, for example, who spend most of their day—
and much of their waking life—at Target.
Even the most nefarious of corporations—companies that
busily pollute waterways or deceive their customers—rarely
affect their victims on a moral level. Ordinarily, the harm
imposed is physical or economic. I by no means wish to
underestimate the gravity of such harm, but must nevertheless
point out that it matters little when the focus of our inquiry is
limited to the moral well-being (the virtue) of corporate
constituencies.
But there are important exceptions. For every corporate
environmental polluter in existence there are also genuine
corporate cultural polluters—companies whose products and
activities make the exercise of goodness and virtue much more
difficult. Indeed, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that
corporate marketing and advertising bombards the individual
with an endless stream of messages exalting practically every
vice and undermining every virtue imaginable. 134 The culture of
temptation that this gives rise to is exactly the kind of
133. See infra notes 137–45 and accompanying text (clarifying that although
traditionally investors are bifurcated into stockholders and bondholders, in this
case they can be grouped into one category of investors).
134. See PETER A. FRENCH, CORPORATE ETHICS 48–49 (1995) (describing the
power of corporate advertising to exploit the weaknesses of consumers); see also,
e.g., Stephanie Pappas, 30% of Girls’ Clothing Is Sexualized in Major Sales
Trend, LIVESCIENCE (May 20, 2011 10:36 AM), http://www.livescience.com/
14249-girls-clothing-sexualized.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (finding that
almost a third of clothing sold and marketed to girls aged “toddler[] to pre-teen”
at “15 national retailers, from high-end stores such as Neiman Marcus to
inexpensive stores such as Kmart and Target” is “sexualized” in design and
appearance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE

35

environment that makes the development of virtue more difficult
and therefore less likely. 135
But even with respect to these corporations, the “cultural
polluters,” those on the inside are still more likely to be
vulnerable when it comes to the development and preservation of
virtue than those on the outside. Generally speaking, the overall
cultural degradation effected by corporate conduct will harm both
insiders and outsiders equally. 136 But the insiders of the
corporation will most likely be assailed by an additional layer of
degradation—for they are living in the belly of the beast. The
insiders not only share in the same culturally polluted
environment, but work inside the very factory that’s bellowing
out all the pollution—alongside those who are responsible for
deciding, and executing, the choice to pollute in the first place.
Indeed, the insiders may be relied upon to participate in these
efforts.
Therefore, although all corporate actors would arguably have
some interest in a corporation’s conformity with virtue, not all
parties are equally interested in this conformity. The less a party
identifies with the corporation, the less he or she would be
interested in exercising virtue on the corporation’s behalf or be
vulnerable to its restriction by the corporation. Thus, those
constituencies that are most external to the corporation—
business partners, customers, and the communities where it does
business—would not be the appropriate constituencies to focus on
as the key to corporate virtue.
Next, let us consider a corporation’s investors—a
constituency that arguably straddles the divide between external
and internal. To what degree do investors have an interest in
corporate virtue? Traditionally, investors have been bifurcated
135. See Yuval Eylon, Virtue and Continence, 12 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL
PRAC. 137, 146 (2009) (highlighting the difficulty of acting virtuously because an
individual must recognize temptation as “something that might mislead
someone into acting non-virtuously”).
136. An exception would exist in situations where a corporation sells and
markets its products in particular, targeted communities. There are examples of
this, most notably with regard to certain liquor companies that have
traditionally advertised most heavily in lower-income neighborhoods. See Bob
Sector, Cities/Billboard Battle: Priest Pleads Moral Right to Deface Ads, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at A5; see also Stuart Elliott, Liquor Ads Cut in Minority
Areas, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 1990, at B1.

36

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2012)

into the categories of equity (stockholders) and debt
(bondholders). 137 Further, stockholders have traditionally been
characterized as owners of the corporation, and with this
characterization flowed several important practical and rhetorical
consequences. 138 As a result, if anyone’s morality ought to govern
the conduct of the corporation, it would seem to be that of the
shareholders. 139 In any event, it would not be appropriate to
combine stockholders and bondholders into one constituency
class.
But under the nexus of contracts approach, this distinction is
much less rigid. Moreover, for our purposes, this distinction is
much less important. Under the contractarian approach,
stockholders are not owners of the corporation, but merely one of
many corporate constituencies. 140 That said, stockholders are
afforded “ownership-like” rights in the corporation under the
contractarian approach, but for reasons that are wholly economic
in nature. 141 This permits us to join stockholders and bondholders
together as a class of actors (“investors”) whose interest in the
corporation is primarily, if not entirely, economic in nature.
This would seem to comport well with reality. Investors are
ordinarily diffuse and rationally apathetic, and do not follow the
137. See Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The Corporation, the
Bondholder, and Fiduciary Duties, 101 J.L. & COM. 187, 196 (1991) (“[T]he
argument that bondholders and stockholders should be viewed simply as
different classes of investors in the corporation undeniably has some
legitimacy.”). See also generally Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and
Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. L. 205 (1988).
138. See 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 420 (2011) (noting that some courts
“regard the stockholders as the equitable owners of the assets”); 11 WILLIAM
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 5100
(explaining that shareholders have “a beneficial interest in the corporate
property . . . [including] a proprietary interest in the corporation and a qualified
beneficial interest that is an indirect or collateral interest in the corporate
property.”).
139. This is exactly something I have argued in my previous scholarship. See
Colombo, supra note 120, at 267–68.
140. See Brian McCall, The Corporation as Imperfect Society, DEL. J. CORP.
L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 9) (“[Some] scholars see the corporation as
joint property; a corporation is owned by a variety of constituencies whose
ownership takes different forms.”).
141. See id. at 7 (“Corporate decision making is placed in the realm of
economic decision making which is rooted in the idea of negotiating for one’s
particular or individual economic best interest.”).
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corporations in which they have invested particularly closely. 142
Moreover, most investors are not even human. Institutional
investors dominate the equities markets, and they have often
invested via an intermediary such as another institution, like a
hedge fund or mutual fund. 143 Such actors are unlikely to have a
particularly strong interest in corporate virtue. 144 Indeed, as one
philosopher has described them, shareholders “‘have none of the
pride or responsibility of ownership and are, if truth be told, only
there for the money.’” 145 This would suggest that we disqualify
corporate investors from further consideration as potential
progenitors and guardians of corporate virtue.
Remaining for our consideration are the three constituencies
clearly internal to the corporation: employees, officers, and
directors. As internal to the corporation, each of these
constituencies certainly identifies with the corporation to a
degree. Indeed, unlike the previous constituencies considered
(whose relationships to the corporation were primarily if not
wholly economic in nature), these remaining three constituencies
are characterized by relationships with the corporation that are
richer, deeper, and indeed more personal in nature. Employees
and officers of a corporation identify with a corporation in ways
that customers, suppliers, and the larger community simply do
not—usually. Directors also have ties to the corporation that
transcend their compensation—ties that impose legal duties and
ties that have reputational consequences.
Thus, taking a first cut at the question would seem to
eliminate investors, customers, business partners, and the larger
community within which the corporation operates as potential
fulcra of corporate virtue. These constituencies seem, generally
and relatively speaking, to lack interest in corporate virtue, and
142. See Ribstein, supra note 126, at 1022.
143. See Blerina Reca, Richard W. Sias & Harry J. Turtle, Are Institutional
Investors Informed? Evidence from Entry, Exit and Adjustments 2 (Feb. 14,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.mfa2011.com/papers/
RecaSiasTurtle%20-%20Are%20Institutional%20Investors%20Informed.pdf
(“[I]nstitutional investors dominate the trading of securities.”).
144. But see Colombo, supra note 120, at 266 n.145 (arguing that the moral
responsibility of ownership does not lessen with attenuation).
145. Moore, supra note 6, at 239 (quoting Charles Handy, What’s a Business
For?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 49, 51 (emphasis added)).
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are less vulnerable toward the corporation when it comes to
safeguarding their own personal virtue. This cut would seem to
be confirmed when we consider the constituency’s ability to
influence the corporation via the exercise of virtue. The parties in
the strongest position to influence corporate action, via the
exercise of virtuous decision making, would appear to be the
directors, officers, and employees. Admittedly, to a limited extent,
the shareholders also share in this power, and to an even more
limited extent, so do the other constituencies previously
considered. 146 But for these non-internal constituencies, there is a
sharp decline in the opportunity and ability to affect corporate
conduct.
Our inquiry is not, however, at its end. For the internal
constituencies differ dramatically from one another, and
additional analysis is merited to see which among them holds the
key—or should hold the key—to corporate virtue.
First, consider low-level corporate employees. Due to the
limited degree of discretion that often characterizes their work,
these individuals would not be expected to have a tremendous
interest in exercising control over corporate virtue, especially in
relation to the interest possessed by the other internal corporate
constituencies. Indeed, low-level employees are not likely to be
confronted with the tough questions and decisions that implicate
virtue—such questions and decisions would ordinarily be referred
to a more senior employee for resolution. 147
This suggests that low-level employees suffer less
vulnerability when it comes to the potential inhibition of virtue.
The relative lack of knowledge they possess with regard to the
146. The power of the shareholders is limited because their ability to
exercise power over corporate conduct is restricted to the following means:
(i) the election of directors; (ii) the making of shareholder proposals; (iii) voting
upon certain fundamental changes to the corporation; and (iv) initiation of
shareholder derivative suits. See 2 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 9:12 (3d. ed. 2010); see also 5 WILLIAM
MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 2097 (2011) (describing the general, but limited, powers of the shareholders).
147. See RICHARD SENNETT, THE CORROSION OF CHARACTER 42–45 (1998)
(elucidating the implications of hierarchical control within industrial
companies). Indeed, corporate life for the low-level, white-collar employee has
become the stuff of dark humor. See, e.g., Dilbert (comic strip); The Office (NBC
television broadcast).

TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE

39

consequences of their actions, coupled with the lack of
discretionary decision making afforded to them, suggests that
their moral compasses will infrequently be implicated and even
less frequently overridden. Low-level employees, therefore, are
not likely to have a significant interest in corporate virtue.
Additionally, employees, especially low-level employees,
oftentimes stand in a quasi-hostile posture when it comes to their
corporate employer, underscored most vividly by the phenomenon
of unionization. This undermines the argument that employees
identify with their corporations, and suggests that employees are
not particularly well suited for exercising virtue on behalf of the
corporation.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the two remaining candidates are
the directors and officers of the corporation. Both these
constituencies identify and connect with the corporation in ways
that none of the other constituencies are. Both wield authority,
and exercise discretion within the corporation to an extent that
none of the other constituencies do. Indeed, both are entrusted
with the management of the corporation under corporate law. 148
This suggests that when it comes to the question of virtue
and the corporation, both directors and officers share in the
responsibility to steer their firms along a path informed by virtue.
This comports with research on the formation of corporate
culture, which has found that top management is a principal
source for a corporation’s cultural beliefs and values. 149
But even here, important distinctions can be made—
distinctions which lead to the conclusion that a corporation’s
officers should be the primary focus when it comes to the
promotion and guardianship of virtue within the corporation.
This conclusion will probably be unexpected to many who are
familiar with corporate law scholarship. After all, directors
receive the lion’s share of attention when it comes to all matters
of corporate governance. 150 That said, officers also “play a critical
148. See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 1:2 (2011)
(describing the responsibilities of directors and officers); see also 22 ALAN S.
GUTTERMAN, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS SOLUTIONS § 98:12 (2011).
149. See R. Eric Reidenbach & Donald P. Robin, A Conceptual Model of
Corporate Moral Development, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 273, 273 (1991).
150. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of
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role in corporate governance.” 151 Scholars are increasingly coming
to the view that officers, rather than directors, truly control the
modern business corporation. 152 As such, this Article is not alone
in asserting that “fraud prevention and the encouragement of
more laudable corporate conduct . . . must focus on corporate
officers, not just directors.” 153 This is true for at least two
important reasons.
Although both directors and officers serve as critical
corporate decision makers, directors discharge this duty on a
broader, higher, more generalized level. Directors ordinarily
employ their discretion to set corporate policy, and officers
employ their discretion to implement corporate policy. As such,
virtuous and ethical decision making is usually most difficult and
contentious at the officer’s level of implementation. Widespread
agreement can oftentimes be marshaled for general propositions
of virtuous conduct (such as, “thou shall not kill”), but far less
agreement can usually be reached when such propositions are
applied to particularized situations. Such application is the stuff
out of which virtue is truly developed, as attested to by the folk
wisdom contained in sayings such as “talk is cheap” and “actions
speak louder than words.” 154 By making corporate officers the
focus of virtue, we both situate the exercise of virtue in that
location where it shall most effectively be developed and where
its exercise is most critical. 155 Indeed, when one examines the

Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (explaining the theory of director primacy
which asserts that the board of directors controls corporations).
151. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate
Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 663 (2007).
152. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the
Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 104 (2004). But see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (“Neither shareholders nor managers control
corporations—boards of directors do.”).
153. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 151, at 665.
154. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 55 (“While it is important to
know what is right, the more daunting challenge in ethics is to discover how to
get yourself and others to do the right thing and to avoid doing the wrong
thing.”); see also Kohlberg, supra note 53, at 386 (“[M]oral character traits
should be assessed from actions, rather than from judgments and feelings.”).
155. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 83 (“Upper management is critical in
determining the ethical culture of an organization.”); see also Peter F. Drucker,
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various corporate scandals with which so many of us have become
familiar, one observes the fact that officers—not directors—
usually “played a central role.” 156
The preceding goes largely to the question of the relative
strength of directors versus officers when it comes to the exercise
of virtue. When it comes to questions of interest and
vulnerability, here too the analysis cuts in favor of identifying the
officers as the essential repositories of corporate virtue.
Officers bond with their corporations to a degree that
directors do not. 157 Whereas an individual director oftentimes sits
on multiple corporate boards, an individual officer rarely serves
more than one company. Whereas directors meet periodically to
discharge their responsibilities to the corporation, officers are
ordinarily working busily each day—and often well into the
night—in the discharge of their duties. Whereas the directors of a
corporation might broadly identify with the companies on whose
boards they serve, officers largely define themselves by their
corporate role. Indeed, for many officers, their role within and
responsibilities to the corporation can take on a vocational
nature, which is rarely the case when it comes to directors, who
are usually much more removed and dissociated from the
corporations they serve. 158
What Is “Business Ethics”?, NAT’L AFF., Spring 1981, at 18, 36 (noting that it is
important for managers to serve as role models for ethical behavior and to shun
behavior that is not appropriate); cf. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers
and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 439 (2005) (“Corporate
officers stand at the very center of recent business scandals.”).
156. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 151, at 665; see also Lyman Johnson &
Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS.
LAW. 1105, 1105–06 (2009) (noting the influence of corporate executives in
recent corporate failures such as Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom).
157. Specifically, outside or independent directors.
158. See Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate
Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1453 (2011) (“Directors are usually officers
of other companies, and acting as a director occupies only a small fraction of any
given director’s time.”). But see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled
CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1044 (2010).
The shift of power from CEOs to outside board members also has
implications for the type of persons who will serve on corporate
boards. Compared to outside directors fifteen years ago, outside
directors today are likely to have more power, to enjoy a less collegial
relationship to the insiders, to have a greater workload, to earn
greater pay, to have occasional need to become confrontational, and to
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All this strongly suggests that a corporation’s officers have a
superior interest in exercising virtue on behalf of the corporation
relative to the interest of directors. Indeed, a corporate officer’s
development as a human being may very well turn on how she
discharges the corporate duties that dominate her daily life, 159
which is not ordinarily the case when it comes to directors. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the call for ethics in business “does not
come primarily from an outraged public, the polemics-hungry
press, or publicly-minded congressional committees.” 160 Instead,
“[i]t comes from executives themselves who want the opportunity
to think through and clarify the conflicts in which they find
themselves on a daily basis.” 161
Related closely to the question of interest is the question of
vulnerability. Inability to exercise virtue in his or her role as an
officer can impact an officer’s life in a tremendous way. Indeed, as
mentioned, it could very well be a (de)formative influence in the
officer’s life. 162 A director’s life, on the other hand, is not so
heavily characterized by his or her duties as a board member,
deal more often with vocal and resistive shareholders.
159. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Social Structures and Their Threats to Moral
Agency, 74 PHIL. 311, 315 (1999) (“For the lives of individuals are constituted in
large part by the various roles that they play . . . .”); cf. EDWIN M. HARTMAN,
ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS AND THE GOOD LIFE 85 (1996) (explaining that the
design of a morally sound organization would be “productive but not unjustly
hard on any stakeholder”). Adopting a rule which placed a corporation’s moral
direction in the hands of its officers would also, it seems, comport with a
Rawlsian sense of justice as well—given the preceding discussion of interests
and vulnerabilities.
160. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 5.
161. Id.
162. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 72 (“Aristotle taught that we
tend to become what we do.”). In more recent times, Katherine Kruse has
eloquently remarked:
Because our personal moral commitments play such an important
role in shaping our lives and personal identities, acting contrary to
our moral values engenders a sense of personal failure and special
regret, even if that failure is due to circumstances outside of our
control. Once chosen or articulated through life decisions, achieving a
life consistent with our values becomes an important part of our
personal identities—or, in the words of Bernard Williams, the nexus
of “ground projects” that give shape and meaning to our lives.
Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90
MINN. L. REV. 389, 406 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
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and as such is significantly less vulnerable to harms occasioned
via a restriction on his or her moral judgment.
Unfortunately, officers are a woefully under-theorized
component of the corporate enterprise, 163 and this undermines
pinning anything upon officers as a class. Hopefully, the efforts
taken to distinguish officers from directors here will serve the
additional purpose of helping to rectify this under-theorization.
In sum, from a nexus-of-contracts perspective it would
appear as though the officers of a corporation constitute that
constituency which is most critical to the question of virtue. 164
C. Virtue and Corporate Law—A Diagnosis
Having identified corporate officers as the key to corporate
virtue, we can now turn to the question of how best to reform
corporate law so as to simultaneously (i) foster virtue among
corporate officers and (ii) empower the exercise of virtue among
corporate officers—two interrelated, and mutually enforcing
aims.165 In this subpart and the one immediately following, I shall
163. See Michael Follett, Gantler v. Stephens: Big Ephiphany or Big
Failure?, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 564 (2010) (“[C]ourts have yet to fully define
corporate officers’ roles.”). An impressive effort to remedy the dearth of
scholarship on corporate officers has been undertaken by Lyman Johnson. See,
e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Law Professors as Gatekeepers, 6 ST.
THOMAS L.J. 447, 450 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson, Gatekeepers] (noting the
misconception by corporate officers that they are required by law to maximize
profits and arguing that calls for professionalism have failed to balance this
misconception); Johnson, supra note 155, at 440 (arguing that vague theories
that officers are “fiduciaries” do not have the support of any conceptual or
positive law foundations); Johnson & Ricca, supra note 151, at 663 (discussing
the question of whether the corporate officer’s duties are equivalent to that of
the corporate director).
164. This is not to suggest that the other constituencies play no role, but
merely that the officers play the most vital role. The board of directors, in
particular, would still need to play an important supporting role. See SIMS,
supra note 16, at 21 (suggesting that unethical actions of managers results from
organizational life, which is structured by the board of directors).
165. Of course, some will object to any effort to empower a corporation’s
officers with the ability to bring moral judgments into his or her decision
making process. “Cries of inefficiency and moral imperialism from the right
would be matched by cries of insensitivity and illegitimacy from the left, all in
the name of preserving us from corporations and managers run morally amok.”
Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Matthews, Jr., Can a Corporation Have a
Conscience?, 60 HARV. BUS. REV. 132, 137 (1982). Like Goodpaster and
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not lay out a comprehensive plan for reform, but will instead, in
broad strokes, outline substantive and structural obstacles to
corporate virtue and suggest changes that I believe would help
remove these obstacles.
Substantively, the simplest and most effective way for
corporate law to encourage and promote virtue is to stop
punishing it. 166 And as currently fashioned and interpreted, that
is essentially what corporate law does—it precludes corporate
officers and directors from taking moral considerations into
account per se, and threatens them with liability to the extent
that they do. As Williams Wines and Brooke Hamilton wrote: “it
is necessary to look for ways to redesign the corporate box so that
working within it does not exclude law and ethics as decisionmaking factors.” 167
The primary culprit in maintaining a “corporate box” that
excludes considerations of virtue is the “shareholder primacy
norm.” As generally (although, arguably, incorrectly) 168
understood, the shareholder primacy norm directs a corporation’s
officers (and directors) to endeavor toward the maximization of
shareholder wealth. This single-minded objective countenances
no role for moral or ethical thought, unless such considerations
have instrumental value, and can themselves be marshaled
toward the furtherance of shareholder wealth. 169 Indeed, the only
Matthews, I believe that the responses to these concerns are largely convincing.
See id. at 139–41 (responding to objections).
166. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 75 (urging organizations to
become “more like town meetings and less like the hierarchical organizational
charts derived from military models”).
167. Id.
168. See Johnson, Gatekeepers, supra note 163 at 450 (“[N]o law requires
that businesses pursue only the goal of corporate profit or the goal of investor
wealth maximization.”); Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability,
Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV.
987, 995–1007 (2009) (observing that corporate law originates from corporate
charters and bylaws, state statutes, and judicial decisions and discussing the
conspicuous absence of the shareholder-wealth maximization obligation from
any of these sources); Colombo, supra note 120, at 268–70 (arguing that a broad
duty to shareholders that encompasses more than wealth maximization “should
be received as the restoration of a principle that has been unduly narrowed to
consider economic interests alone”).
169. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad,
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773, 775–76 (emphasizing the inherent destructive
force of the shareholder wealth maximizing duty). The wealth maximization
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restriction on an officer’s (or director’s) decision making within
the paradigm of shareholder primacy is obedience to the law (and
there are even scholars who question that). 170 As MacIntyre
summarized it:
In his capacity of corporate executive, the manager not only
has no need to take account of, but must not take account of
certain types of considerations which he might feel obliged to
recognise were he acting as parent, as consumer, or as
citizen. 171

Toward this singular end, officers and directors are bound
via judicially enforceable fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,
under pain of a shareholder derivative lawsuit should they
waver. 172
The force of this directive is somewhat blunted by the
“business judgment rule,” pursuant to which the courts will
ordinarily presume that a corporate defendant did indeed fulfill
his or her fiduciary duties when deciding upon a particular course
of action. 173 But the business judgment rule notwithstanding, the
shareholder primacy norm remains a powerful influence for at
least a couple of reasons.
First, the availability of the business judgment rule as a
defense for corporate officers (as opposed to corporate directors) is
not entirely settled. 174 Indeed, the most recent decision from the
norm is, of course, a child of capitalism generally. Adam Smith himself “equated
the growth of markets and the division of labor with the material progress of
society, but not with its moral progress.” SENNETT, supra note 147, at 38.
170. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by
Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1168 n.36 (1982) (“[M]anagers
have no general obligation to avoid violating regulatory laws, when violations
are profitable to the firm . . . .”).
171. Moore, supra note 6, at 239 (quoting Alasdair MacIntyre, Corporate
Modernity and Moral Judgement: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, in ETHICS AND
PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 122, 126 (K.E. Goodpaster & K.M. Sayre eds.,
1979)).
172. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, at 408–10 (discussing the different
views of the relationship between officers/directors and shareholder and noting
the common theme of fiduciary obligations and the threat of a shareholder
derivative suit).
173. See Sneirson, supra note 168, at 1005–06 (noting the deference of the
courts under the business judgment rule).
174. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, at 285–86 (observing that “judicial
precedents are divided” on the question of corporate officers’ coverage by the
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Delaware Supreme Court was not entirely clear on this very
question. 175 Thus, although most commentators believe the rule is
applicable to officer conduct; 176 the existence of doubt can only
work to impede any divergence from the shareholder primacy
norm.
Second, and most importantly: even if the business judgment
rule clearly applies to protect corporate officers, the powerful
expressive power of the law remains. The simple fact that officers
are understood to have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder
wealth has enormous sway even if this duty is practically
unenforceable under most circumstances. A growing body of
scholarship supports the notion that law possesses an “ability to
influence individual behavior by an existence decoupled from its
enforcement.” 177 Indeed, the officer or director who takes his or
her corporate duties seriously will often consider the “right thing
to do” as deciding in favor of a project or undertaking that
maximizes shareholder wealth, without reference to potential
liability for choosing otherwise. 178 Thus, the law conditions
corporate officers to view shareholder primacy as not merely an
operational objective, but as an ethical obligation as well. And
this norm perniciously displaces other notions of right and
business judgment rule); Johnson & Ricca, supra note 151, at 663 (discussing
the fiduciary duties of officers as agents and whether these duties are identical
to the fiduciary duties imposed on directors).
175. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2009) (finding that the
fiduciary duties of directors and officers are identical but failing to discuss the
applicability of the business judgment rule).
176. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Should the Business Judgment Rule Apply to
Corporate Officers, and Does It Matter?, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 237, 237 (2006)
(asserting that the conventional wisdom is that the business judgment rule
applies to corporate officers); Follett, supra note 163, at 570 (stating that
Delaware court decisions have indicated that corporate officers share in the
protection afforded by the business judgment rule).
177. Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1379, 1384 (2008).
178. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 73–74 (using Professor
Zimbardo’s guard/prisoner role-playing experiment to discuss the debasing
influence of role on human behavior); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Team
Spirit: Doing Bad Things in the Cause of Good, in THE RANGE OF EVIL:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF HUMAN WICKEDNESS 5, 6 (William Andrew
Myers, ed., Interdisciplinary Press, 2006) (“But put people in an institution and
tell them that their job is to increase profits, and a startlingly large number
seem to take leave of their ordinary moral sensibilities.”).
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wrong—even the personal morality of the decision maker. 179 As
MacIntyre observed:
Managers themselves and most writers about management
conceive of them as morally neutral characters whose skills
enable them to devise the most efficient means of achieving
whatever end is proposed. Whether a given manager is
effective or not is in the dominant view a quite different
question from that of the morality of the ends which his
effectiveness serves or fails to serve. 180

Thus, substantively speaking, the shareholder primacy norm
appears to be the principal obstacle to a more robust
consideration of virtue among corporate officers. This is a
particularly curious development since none less than Peter
Drucker—the man who “was the creator and inventor of modern
management” 181—has opined that “[t]here is only one ethics, one
set of rules of morality, one code, that of individual behavior in
which the same rules apply to everyone alike.” 182 He rejected the
179. “In the ensuing anarchy the bad drove out the good, the big drove out
the small, and the brawn drove out the brains. There was a single trait common
to denizens of the back row . . . [t]hey sensed that they needed to shed whatever
refinements of personality and intellect they had brought with them to Salomon
Brothers.” MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER 41 (1989), quoted in SOLOMON, supra
note 21, at 13.
Anecdotally, I have had the pleasure of teaching a corporate governance
seminar at two different law schools over the past three years. An early exercise
performed in the seminar requires the students to imagine themselves to be
partners in a partnership. I ask the students whether, as partners, they would
authorize the creation and sale of “puppy torture videos” if such videos would be
profitable (both short and long term). The students unanimously oppose the
idea. Later on, I ask the students to imagine themselves to be corporate
directors. Once again I confront them with an opportunity to produce and sell
“puppy torture videos,” which (once again) I posit would be profitable. This time,
the students overwhelmingly approve the proposal. Their reasoning: their duty
as directors requires them to put aside their personal moral qualms and pursue
whatever opportunities would maximize shareholder wealth. When pressed as
to who has the ultimate moral responsibility for making such decisions, they
respond: “the shareholders.”
180. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 74 (1984), quoted in John Dobson,
MacIntyre’s Position on Business: A Response to Wicks, 7 BUS. ETHICS Q. 125,
128 (1997). Indeed, “modern business is so immersed in its context of
individualism, acquisitiveness, and market values that it does not even realize
that this is a [moral] context.” Dobson, supra, at 128.
181. John A. Byrne, The Man Who Invented Management, BUS. WK., Nov.
28, 2005, at 98.
182. Peter F. Drucker, What Is “Business Ethics”?, NAT’L AFF., Spring 1981,
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notion that one’s morality needed to be checked at the office or
boardroom door. 183
This naturally raises the question: How did such an
unyielding norm come into being? How has the bifurcation of
“private” versus “corporate” morality come about? Although the
shareholder primacy norm is the means by which this bifurcation
is perpetuated, there is no reason why the norm needed to take
on such an imperialistic quality. In other words, we can readily
imagine a state of affairs pursuant to which the norm is qualified
by notions of private and/or traditional morality. Instead, we
come to accept a state of affairs well captured by Bismark’s
remark: “What a scoundrel a minister would be if, in his own
private life, he did half the things he has a duty to do to be true to
his oath of office?” 184
Philosophically, this phenomenon is a form of casuistry. 185 It
is predicated on the notion that one’s moral obligations change
when one is no longer deciding for himself or herself, but on
behalf of a group for which he or she is responsible. 186 Jane
Jacobs explored this subject at length in her classic work,
Systems of Survival. 187 According to Jacobs, the mixture of moral
norms suitable in one context to another is not merely
unnecessary, but rather threatens to create “monstrous moral
hybrids.” 188
Although casuistry could operate to ratchet up one’s moral
obligations (such as when a mother sacrifices what is rightfully
at 18, 19.
183. See id. (“There is only one code of ethics, that of individual behavior, for
prince and pauper, for rich and poor, for the mighty and the meek alike.”).
184. Id. at 26. Drucker distinguishes casuistry from the ethics of
interdependence, which he ascribes to Confucian origin. See id. at 30 (noting
that Confucianism prescribes five different general ethics according to the
relationship, which allows it to escape the mistake made by casuistry ethics by
combining the flexibility of situational ethics with the moral imperatives of
universal ethics).
185. See id. at 22 (noting that casuistry, like business ethics, was an attempt
to create “a set of special ethics for those in power”).
186. See id. (“[T]he ruler has a duty . . . to subordinate his individual
behavior and his individual conscience to the demands of his social
responsibility.”).
187. JANE JACOBS, SYSTEMS OF SURVIVAL (1992).
188. Id. at 80–81.
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hers for the well-being of her children), it can also take on a less
savory character (as exemplified by Bismark’s remark). 189
Moreover, although casuistry can be justifiably defended in
principal, 190 on a practical level it suffers from a serious defect: it
largely enables those in positions of responsibility to evade
traditional notions of morality and define for themselves what
their moral obligations are given their particular situation. 191 A
more direct conflict of interest is difficult to find.
Nevertheless, this Article does not endeavor to resolve the
debate over casuistry. Indeed, the debate is fraught with
difficulty. As R.H. Tawney aptly observed:
To argue, in the manner of Machiavelli, that there is one rule
for business and another for private life, is to open the door to
an orgy of unscrupulousness before which the mind recoils. To
argue that there is no difference at all is to lay down a
principle which few men who have faced the difficulty in
practice will be prepared to endorse as of invariable
application, and incidentally to expose the ideas of morality
itself to discredit by subjecting it to an almost intolerable
strain. 192

Fortunately, this dilemma need not be resolved here. For
present purposes, I believe we can proceed upon the assumption
that there is—or should be—more of an overlap than presently
appreciated. More specifically, it would seem to me that an
individual who becomes a corporate officer takes on additional
moral and ethical duties on account of that role, but in so doing
does not, as a general matter, relinquish preexisting moral
duties. Indeed, a major theme of virtue ethics is to live one’s life
consistently—to “view one’s life as a whole and not separate the
personal and the public or professional, or duty and pleasure.” 193
189. See supra text accompanying note 184 (noting Drucker’s distinction
between casuistry and the ethics of interdependence).
190. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 46–50
(2010) (discussing a lawyer’s obligation to represent her clients to the best of her
ability).
191. See Drucker, supra note 182, at 24 (arguing that casuistry implies that
“the rules which decide what is ethical for ordinary people do not apply equally,
if at all, to those with social responsibility”).
192. R.H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 184 (1926), quoted
in SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 145.
193. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 105.
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Thus, while an individual’s role or station in life might impose
upon him or her a new set of ethical duties, these duties should
not ordinarily be understood to conflict with other operable,
preexisting ethical duties. 194 Application of the greatest of virtues
to Aristotle—“phronesis” or “prudence”—should help an officer
appreciate this and navigate any apparent conflict. 195
Moreover, the position that one need not subjugate his or her
moral principles while serving as a corporate officer arguably has
support from sources of mainstream corporate law as well.
Consider, for example, the American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance. 196 The ALI’s Principles defines the officer’s
duty of care in Section 4.01 as
to perform the director’s or officer’s functions in good faith, in
a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an

194. On this point in particular I part company with Robert Solomon, who
declares that there is “no denying the disunity of virtues” and admits the
possibility of intractable conflicts of demands due to one’s various roles and
responsibilities in life. See id. at 167, 260–61. To resolve these conflicts, Solomon
says an individual must rely on his or her judgment and simply do the best that
he or she can in the situation. See id. at 260 (“[E]ven Aristotle realized that the
search for the perfect world was futile, that one did the best with what one
had.”). I, on the other hand, am of the belief that one’s ethical obligations should
not conflict if properly understood and appropriately defined. See Earl Conee,
Against Moral Dilemmas, 91 PHIL. REV. 87, 87–90 (1982) (arguing that moral
dilemmas are nonexistent); see also Terrance McConnell, Moral Dilemmas, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(2010),
available
at
STANFORD
http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/sum2010/entries/moral-dilemmas/ (discussing
the two most widely cited examples of a moral dilemma and describing how both
examples do not illustrate an actual moral dilemma). Consider a father who
promises to take his son to a ballgame on Saturday. Assume the father’s car
breaks down, and the only way he can get his son to the game in time would be
to “borrow” (without permission) his neighbor’s car by hot-wiring it. Are we
confronted with an irreconcilable clash of duties—the duty to keep one’s
promises, and the duty to obey the law? Of course not—the father’s duty to keep
his promise was subject to the unstated proviso that he was able to reasonably
(and lawfully) fulfill it. For an example of an attempt to provide moral reasoning
to a more difficult situation, see Lois Shepherd, Sophie’s Choice: Medical and
Legal Responses to Suffering, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 103, 148–55 (1996).
195. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 174 (“Aristotle thought that it was
‘good judgment’ or phronesis that was of the greatest importance in ethics.”).
196. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1992).
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ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. 197

Consider also Section 2.01 of The ALI’s Principles (“The Objective
and Conduct of the Corporation”) which reads:
a. [A] corporation should have as its objective the
conduct of business activities with a view to
enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.
b. Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not
thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of
its business:
1. Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person,
to act within the boundaries set by law;
2. May take into account ethical considerations that
are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the
responsible conduct of business; and
3. May devote a reasonable amount of resources to
public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and
philanthropic purposes. 198
Neither Section 4.01 nor Section 2.01 suggests that the
officer must disregard his or her humanity by discarding the
dictates of morals and conscience. Certainly, the officer’s conduct
must be directed to “the best interests of the corporation,” but
conjunctively joined to this objective is the command that the
officer exercise “the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under
similar circumstances.” 199 I would suggest that an “ordinary”
person, prudent or otherwise, would be an individual in
possession of some preexisting sense of right and wrong, some
moral code by which he or she lives.
Further, Section 2.01 explicitly acknowledges that pursuit of
corporate objectives “[m]ay take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the
responsible conduct of business.” 200 This would appear to confirm
the propriety of an officer’s exercise of independent moral
judgment. Thus, an officer’s reliance upon his or her moral
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. § 4.01.
Id. § 2.01.
Id. § 4.01.
Id. § 2.01.

52

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2012)

principles in the execution of his or her corporate duties would
not appear to be in derogation of the officer’s ethical obligations to
the firm but rather fully consistent with such obligations.
The shareholder primacy norm, generally understood as
obliging strict shareholder wealth maximization, could thus be
viewed as unnecessary and detrimental casuistry at work: 201
unnecessary because it fails to accurately capture the law’s
nuances for the reasons set forth immediately above, 202 and
detrimental because it invites acquiescence to powerful
temptations. In corporations, executive compensation (and,
moreover, job retention) is often linked to performance. 203
Performance, in turn, is usually linked to corporate profitability
and stock appreciation. 204 Officers are thus confronted with a
situation in which it pays them—literally—to discard traditional
notions of right and wrong in favor of a rule that permits them to
do pretty much whatever they can to increase shareholder
wealth. This is a powerful material incentive for any human
being and suggests that the expansive understanding of the
shareholder primacy norm may be an example of rationalization.
And then there is the added influence of peer pressure.
Shareholder satisfaction, ordinarily driven by profits and upward
stock movement, affects all of the corporation’s officers and,
understandably, has become a matter of some fixation. 205 As
such, anything that a particular officer might do to jeopardize
shareholder contentment concerns every other officer in the firm
201. Alasdair MacIntyre, Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgement: Are
They Mutually Exclusive?, in ETHICS AND PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 122,
126–27 (K.E. Goodpaster & K. M. Sayre, eds. 1979) (“Corporate existence . . .
presupposes a separation of spheres of existence, a moral distancing of each
social role from each of the others . . . . Thus, when the executive shifts from the
sphere of the family to that of the corporation he or she necessarily shifts moral
perspective.”).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 196–200 (discussing provisions of
the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance which provide
for moral and ethical considerations to influence corporate decision making).
203. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 22, 24, 31–32 (explaining ways in which
financial incentives can be misaligned to encourage unethical decision making).
204. See 1 HR SERIES COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS § 2:17 (2011); WILLIAM A.
CALDWELL, COMPENSATION GUIDE § 17:1 (2011).
205. See Daniel F. Muzyka & Lawrence A. Weiss, Oversight Can Be a
Manager’s Stay-Out-of-Jail Card, GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 30, 2009, at B7; Paul
Read, Executive Pay Growth Here Tepid, J. BUS., Jun. 17, 2010, at A1.

TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE

53

(professionally and personally). Hence, an abundantly scrupulous
officer who interfered with the firm’s financial success is not
likely to be the most popular of colleagues. As Robert Solomon
explained:
What (outside the corporation) might count as “character”
tends to be more of an obstacle than a boon to corporate
success for many people. What seems to count as “character”
in the corporation is a disposition to please others, obey
superiors, follow others, and avoid personal responsibility. 206

Consider the possible long-term effects of such an
environment on the individual officer from a virtue-ethics
perspective. Such an environment not only pressures a corporate
officer to put aside his or her moral qualms regarding any given
situation (or series of situations), 207 but also has the potential to
shape the officer’s personal character over time. 208 It serves to
socialize the officer in a way detrimental to many of the virtues
he or she had previously developed. 209
Structural factors also work to separate a corporate officer
from his or her personal moral compass. 210 The multiple levels of
authority—from shareholders, to directors, to officers, to other
employees—engender confusion over the question of ultimate
moral responsibility for corporate decision making. 211 This evokes
206. See Robert C. Solomon, Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue
Ethics in Business, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 43, 44 (2003).
207. See id. (“[P]eople in corporations tend to behave in conformity with the
people and expectations that surround them, even when what they are told to do
violates their ‘personal morality.’”).
208. See Moore, supra note 6, at 242–43 (arguing that the demands of the
business world require executives to develop a different character when making
business decisions than they would otherwise cultivate in their personal lives).
209. See id. at 244.
210. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 21 (“[T]he bureaucratic structure of modern
corporations encourages managers to behave unethically.”); MacIntyre, supra
note 201, at 132 (“In order for moral judgments to be made at all certain social
conditions have to be satisfied, conditions which are incompatible with the
structures of corporate modernity.”).
211. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 7 (“[T]he rubber check of corporate
responsibility bounces up and down the hierarchy and seems to get cashed out
nowhere.”); MacIntyre, supra note 201, at 122 (“[C]orporate structures fragment
consciousness and more especially moral consciousness”); Moore, supra note 86,
at 334 (identifying phenomena of “groupthink” and “risky shift” in
organizational life); Michael J. Phillips, Corporate Moral Responsibility: When It
Might Matter, 5 BUS. ETH. Q. 555, 567–68 (1995); see also supra note 179 and
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both the chilling Nuremburg refrain of “just following orders,”
along with the results of the Milgram experiments regarding
acquiescence to authority. 212
Additionally, thanks to globalization, an executive in New
York can sell products to customers in California—products that
were manufactured in Switzerland via component parts supplied
from China. The vast distances involved in such globalized
commerce (both physically and psychologically) enable a certain
level of callousness in decision making that is less likely in faceto-face, geographically localized transactions. 213
Finally, the heavily regulated world in which corporations
operate (especially if they happen to be financial corporations)
implicates the problem of “crowding out” morality. Research
suggests that actors in heavily regulated contexts often come to
equate their moral and ethical obligations to their legal or
regulatory obligations. 214 This is problematic and further hinders
the development of virtue because, for a variety of reasons, not all
that is legal is virtuous, and corporate actors fall into the habit of
acting (and sometimes believing) otherwise. Regulatory
requirements, as per Aristotle, might help effectuate virtue—
especially if they are viewed as the floor or the minimum of
permissible ethical behavior. 215 Unfortunately, regulatory
requirements are all too often internalized as coterminous with
(and, effectively, a ceiling on) the demands of ethics. 216 This can
serve to thwart further ethical development.
accompanying text (illustrating the confusion over who has more moral
responsibility—directors or the shareholders).
212. See Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 45 (“People act differently
when they are in groups than when they are not.”); see also Solomon, supra note
206, at 49. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1983).
The Nuremberg trial of Nazi war criminals exposed a striking tendency to shift
blame and moral responsibility to higher-ranking officers, as defendants argued
they were not personally responsible because they were “just following orders.”
Milgram’s experiment in 1961 revealed that a majority of participants would
administer what they thought was an extremely dangerous electrical shock to
another person when an authority figure instructed them to do so, despite their
expressed concerns for the other person’s safety.
213. Cf. Steve Twedt, E-Mail Isn’t the Way to Build Trust at Work, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE, July 11, 2010, at F1.
214. See Colombo, supra note 84, at 845–56.
215. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
216. Cf. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 160–61 (“The idea that the moral life is
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All that said, as indicated previously, role-differentiated
morality is not (in theory) necessarily problematic. 217 One may
very well take the position that, given the specific purpose of the
corporation, and given the specific role that officers play within
the corporation, the ethical thing for an officer to do is to
maximize shareholder wealth. 218 Indeed, this is exactly the
perspective of many commentators and officers themselves. 219
That notwithstanding, I question such a position on a
number of grounds. I find it too convenient, and fear that it
constitutes but a pretextual fig leaf clothing otherwise naked
ambition. 220 But even granting the belief’s sincerity, where else in
life would an ethical obligation such as this one (regarding
property) override all others (including issues of health and
safety)? Consider a few analogies: Would someone, in whose
hands is entrusted the safekeeping of another person’s
automobile, sacrifice his life (or that of another) for the protection
of the car? Would someone, in whose hands is entrusted the
safekeeping of another person’s home, sacrifice her life (or that of
another) for the protection of the home? Most people would not,
which underscores the point that most ethical principles do
indeed, at some point, yield to other, more pressing ethical
principles. (Or, perhaps more accurately, most or many ethical
obligations are presumed contingent upon situation, context, and
other obligations.) Thus, although one can certainly hold the view
that, as a corporate officer, it is her duty to maximize shareholder
profits, I would suggest that few ethicists (and even the officer
herself) would subscribe to the position that this particular
ethical obligation overrides all others. And once that is
acknowledged, it simply becomes a question of which other
largely a matter of carrying out the duties which attach to one’s ‘station’ in
society presupposes an unacceptably conformist attitude towards established
social arrangements.” (quoting Alistair M. MacLeod)).
217. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
218. See McCall, supra note 140, at 7–9.
219. Cf. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 190–204 (explaining how, in
assuming the role of a corporate officer, an individual takes on moral and ethical
duties in addition to, rather than to the exclusion or destruction of, his or her
preexisting duties).
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ethical principles should counteract the wealth maximization
norm, and when.
D. Virtue and Corporate Law—A Prescription
We are finally in a position to consider possible curatives to
the problem of corporate virtue. Not surprisingly, these curatives
largely track, and attempt to counter, the obstacles to corporate
virtue identified above. 221
1. Expansion of the Business Judgment Rule
As mentioned, corporate law currently dissuades the exercise
of virtue (for directors and, most relevantly, for officers) via the
shareholder primacy norm. 222 Officers who refrain from
maximizing shareholder wealth due to moral concerns face the
prospect of liability in a shareholder derivative lawsuit.
One of the most obvious steps that could be taken to remedy
this situation is to clarify the applicability of the business
judgment rule to officer conduct. The coverage that this
protection affords would provide officers with some breathing
room when it comes to the exercise of moral discretion in the
workplace.
The problem with this approach is that it would be
overinclusive (from a virtue-ethics perspective) because it would
cloak all of an officer’s decisions under its protection, and not
merely those related to the exercise of virtue. 223 Given the
discomfort that some scholars have expressed in response to the
idea of extending business judgment rule protections to
221. See supra Part IV.C (presenting a variety of structural and substantive
obstacles to corporate virtue).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 168–172 (describing the prevailing
interpretation of the shareholder primacy norm as a single-minded objective to
maximize shareholder wealth that does not accept moral or ethical
considerations unless they support the ultimate goal of wealth maximization).
223. By “all” I mean to the same extent as the business judgment rule
protects director decision making—protection that extends to all decisions
absent a showing of fraud, illegality, conflict of interest, bad faith, or gross
negligence. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, at § 6.4.
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officers, 224 we should ponder whether a more narrowly tailored
approach is possible.
An example of such a narrower approach would be to hold
the business judgment rule applicable only to those situations
where an officer veers from the shareholder primacy norm in
deference to his or her moral values. 225 Such a rule would be akin,
in many respects, to a conscience protection clause, something
with which the law is already familiar. 226 It would protect the
officer from shareholder derivative lawsuit liability only in
situations falling within these narrow parameters.
The benefits of such a rule would be limited if the officer,
although largely shielded from derivative litigation liability,
would nevertheless be subject to an adverse employment action
as a result of the exercise of his or her moral judgment. (Indeed,
such a situation calls to mind the old joke that in the Soviet
Union every citizen had the freedom to speak his or her mind—
but only one time.) 227 There is no easy solution to this problem.
From the officer’s perspective, the corporation is the venue in
which he or she will, in all likelihood, work out his or her fruition
as a human being. It is at work, which will consume most of the
224. See Johnson, supra note 155, at 440 (arguing that the business
judgment rule does not and should not apply to corporate officers in the same
broad manner as it applies to directors and that officer conduct should be
scrutinized more closely than director conduct).
225. Despite the broad diversity of moral opinion in the twenty-first century,
implementation of this exception should still be possible. See Kohlberg, supra
note 53, at 405
While philosophers have been unable to agree upon any ultimate
principle of the good which would define ‘correct’ moral judgments,
most philosophers agree upon the characteristics which make a
judgment a genuine moral judgment . . . . In this sense we can define
a moral judgment as ‘moral’ without considering its content (the
action judged) and without considering whether it agrees or not with
our own judgments or standards.
226. See WILLIAM W. BASSETT, W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & ROBERT T. SMITH,
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 13:36 (2011) (detailing the evolution
and scope of conscience clauses, under which medical practitioners may decline
to perform certain procedures that are contrary to their religious beliefs or
moral convictions); Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience Clauses” or “Unconscionable
Clauses”: Personal Beliefs v. Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE. J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 269, 271, 274 (2006) (discussing the debate over the
expansion of conscience clauses).
227. Cf. ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (1973).
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waking hours of his life, that the officer will most likely make the
daily decisions that will form him into the person he will
ultimately become. 228 Culture, including corporate culture, “gives
people’s lives meaning.” 229 To the extent that an individual’s
values are shaped by his or her working environment, it is not too
much of an exaggeration to say that the individual is “a corporate
creation.” 230
From the perspective of the board, and of the officer’s
colleagues, the corporation is not a democracy in which each
person should be necessarily free to “define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life.” 231 It is instead, largely, a command-and-control
institution, where order and obedience are paramount. To furnish
each officer with broad discretionary latitude would be
unworkable and detrimental to the ends of the corporation.
Reconciling these important and justifiable interests is
difficult. Here, I shall sketch the contours of a possible means to
do so.
Starting with the officer, it would seem fair to require
complete and full disclosure on his or her part before taking a
particular moral stand. This ex ante declaration is important for
at least two reasons: (1) it will serve to sensitize his or her
colleagues and the board to the moral issues at stake, thus
possibly sparking a dialogue in which either the officer, or the
officer’s colleagues, may shift their position (thus resolving the
situation), and (2) it is necessary to establish a clear record of the
officer’s position—a record that could be reviewed in the event of
a legal challenge over the sincerity of the officer’s claim, and a
record that could be helpful in the event of future situations
where the same officer’s exercise of moral judgment again raises
problems within the firm. We do not want to enable an officer to
use moral qualms as a post-hoc concoction in defense of an
assertion of bad decision making or dereliction of duty.
228. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing how a director’s
moral development hinges on her daily decisions); see also Al Gini, A Short
Primer on Moral Courage, in MORAL COURAGE IN ORGANIZATIONS 8 (Debra R.
Comer & Gina Vega eds., 2011).
229. See HARTMAN, supra note 159, at 153.
230. See id.
231. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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Such disclosure should extend not only to complete candor 232
when explaining the reasoning behind his or her moral judgment
ex ante, but also, arguably, to the hiring and promotional process
as well. To the extent reasonably implicated by the corporation’s
line of business, or a particular position’s responsibilities, the
officer should be required to reveal whatever relevant moral
commitments he or she holds (insofar as they are unlikely to be
appreciated by the firm). Matters of common morality, such as
opposition to murder and theft, would not require disclosure. But
to the extent that the prospective officer holds strongly held
beliefs that are not universally shared (such as an opposition to
gambling, alcohol, or tobacco), and to the extent that such beliefs
could reasonably, foreseeably come into play given the company
and position in question, he or she should be required to divulge
them upon or before hiring (and upon a promotion, to the extent
any previous disclosure would be insufficient). Failure to make
such disclosure calls into question the authenticity of the officer’s
commitment to such principles and beliefs, and would jeopardize
the officer’s protestations should a controversy arise over the
later exercise of his or her moral judgment. Moreover, should an
individual’s deeply held beliefs conflict so much with his or her
potential firm’s business philosophy as to jeopardize that
individual’s hiring, it would appear as though that particular
firm is not a good place for the individual to work. In other words,
if he or she is sincere about his or her values, a career with such
an employer would not seem appropriate. 233 Disclosure is also
necessary out of fairness to the corporation. When hiring or
promoting an officer, the corporation should be apprised of all
material facts that might affect the officer’s ability to discharge
his or her putative future duties. Such disclosure is also
necessary to enable the board of directors and senior
management to fulfill their proper function within the
corporation: the function of managerial oversight. 234 This function
232. See Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them:
Corporate Officers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 255
(2009).
233. Bear in mind that the individual in question is a corporate officer and
not a low-level employee.
234. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, at § 5.8.

60

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2012)

cannot be capably carried out if key decision makers are deprived
of material information regarding the corporation’s officers.
Additionally, clarity could be achieved if the firm were to
amend its charter to spell out the parameters of the business
judgment rule as applicable to its officers. Just as a partnership
may narrow (or broaden) the understanding of “fiduciary duty”
for purposes of the partnership, and just as a contract may
narrow the understanding of “good faith” for its purposes, 235 a
corporation should be permitted to set reasonable parameters on
the freedom of officers to exercise moral judgment within the
corporation. This can take many forms, ranging from the
endorsement and articulation of certain moral principles, to the
disavowal of other moral principles.
Finally, the employment law concept of “accommodation”
could be utilized to require the corporation to work around an
individual officer’s personal moral qualms whenever reasonably
possible. 236 Responsibility for a project deemed objectionable by
an officer could be transferred to someone else. If future conflicts
are anticipated, perhaps the officer himself or herself can be
transferred. In sum, when an officer raises a conscientious
objection to a proposed undertaking, there are solutions short of
either (a) abandoning the undertaking altogether and
(b) dismissing the officer. Those intermediate solutions should be
seriously explored.
Should an accommodation prove unreachable, and should it
concern a matter that was not raised during the hiring or
promotion process, the corporation should have the power to let
the officer go. 237 But it might be a good idea to require that such a
235. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 147–49
(2004); HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8:8 (2011).
236. See 1 PAUL H. TOBIAS, LIT. WRONG. DISCHARGE CLAIMS § 2:55 (2011);
Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115
HARV. L. REV. 642, 648–49 (2001).
237. If the matter did not come up because the officer intentionally or
recklessly withheld his or her beliefs during the hiring or promotion process,
then the corporation should certainly have the right to dismiss the officer. But
even if the only reason the matter did not come up was because it was not
implicated by the position or the employer’s line of business (in other words,
because the officer had no reason to raise whatever moral concern that has now
become an issue at that earlier time), it would still seem fair, ceteris paribus, to
allow the corporation to dismiss the officer.
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resignation/firing come in the form of a “noisy withdrawal” if the
corporation in question is a public one. Borrowing from the “noisy
withdrawal” rule that the SEC considered in the wake of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 238 and the current requirement that public
companies disclose whenever an executive departs for reasons
relating to the corporation’s “policies and practices,” 239 this rule
would require a company to report to the SEC and disclose to the
public (via a Form 8-K) whenever an officer resigns or is fired due
to a moral or ethical disagreement. Moreover, the filing should
set forth, in reasonable detail, the crux of the moral
disagreement. This would ensure that such issues do not escape
the attention of the board of directors, but rather percolate up to
the highest levels within the corporation. It would also enable
shareholders and other corporate constituencies to exercise their
own moral judgment and act upon this information should they
decide to do so.
A common concern raised by such a proposal is that it would
essentially enable each officer to march to the beat of his or her
own drum, giving rise to a cacophony of conflicting moralities
within the firm. 240 This, in turn, is simply one manifestation of
238. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SARBANES–OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE
§§ 5:22, 5:25, 5:26 (2010) (explaining the operation of the Qualified Legal
Compliance Committee and other actors in noisy withdrawal scenarios); David
Waters, The Wisdom of Whistleblowing: The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the
“Noisy Withdrawal” Provision, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 411, 412–14 (2010) (analyzing
the impact of Sarbanes–Oxley on the codes of professional responsibility for
lawyers).
239. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FORM 8-K, ITEM 5.02,
available at http://sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf.
240. Some have raised the concern that such an approach would lead to
lawlessness, as it would give corporate officers license to discard fiduciary duties
in deference to their particular moral scruples. Cf. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (addressing the unmanageability of a
society in which each individual could determine which laws to follow based
upon his or her own conscience), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803.
Although the general thrust of this concern is meritorious, use of the term
“lawlessness” is an exaggeration. This is because we are dealing primarily with
norms (namely, the shareholder primacy norm). Whether an officer is legally
obligated to pursue wealth maximization (versus normatively encouraged to do
so) is a hotly contested issue. Compare BAINBRIDGE, supra note 119, § 9.2, at 417
(“Shareholder wealth maximization is not only the law . . . .”), with Johnson,
Gatekeepers, supra note 163, at 450 (“[N]o law requires that businesses pursue
only the goal of corporate profit or the goal of investor wealth maximization.”).
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the moral pluralism that marks modern society. 241 A better
approach, some would suggest, would be to still such competing
moral voices, prescind from moral questions, and simply focus
wealth maximization and the limits of the law as our guides. 242
Such, of course, is an entirely understandable approach.
Corporate decision making is difficult enough without the added
complexity of taking into account concerns beyond wealth
maximization. 243 Simply put, ethical discourse can get “sloppy,”
and as such many wish to avoid getting bogged down by it. 244 But
we ought to be clear about something: the “cleaner,” more limited
approach is not a “morally neutral” or “amoral” one (as its
proponents or detractors often suggest). 245 Such labels mask the
true nature of the wealth-maximization approach: this position is
itself a point of view informed by its own moral reasoning. 246 I do
not disparage this perspective, but rather suggest that the
common good would be better furthered by an approach which
embraces, rather than silences, moral conversation.
Indeed, the fear of moral diversity calls to mind James
Madison’s famous invection against factions. 247 But for all his
fear of factions, Madison insisted that eliminating the liberty that
241. See Kruse, supra note 162, at 394–96 (discussing moral pluralism as a
condition of free societies).
242. See Colombo, supra note 115, at 92–93 (discussing the views of
proponents of a law and economics viewpoint).
243. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 45–46 (discussing organizational
impediments to decision making).
244. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 48 (“Perhaps, one might think, if only
ethics could be made more precise, more like business, then business ethics
would be more palatable.”).
245. See Robert H. Nelson, Economic Religion Versus Christian Values, 1 J.
MARKETS & MORALITY 142, 154 (1998) (“Economics is thus part of an overall
value system, really a theology of a secular sort.”); Richard A. Posner, Law and
Economics Is Moral, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 163, 166–67 (1990) (discussing an
economic libertarian viewpoint not derived from moral philosophies and
describing wealth maximization as a “cleaner approach”).
246. See Nelson, supra note 245, at 154; Posner, supra note 245, at 166–67
(“You can if you want describe wealth maximization or libertarianism or laissez
faire as moral philosophies. My point is only that I do not intend to try to derive
my free-market views from something more fundamental, more rigorously
philosophical.”).
247. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (describing the danger of
factions and the utility of a republic to cure the effects of factions).
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is their “air” would be a remedy “worse than the disease.” 248
Instead, what is needed (along the lines of what Madison
recommended) is a means for managing moral diversity. 249
Although a detailed plan for managing such diversity is beyond
the scope of this Article, scholars are already exploring ways to do
just this. 250 Anecdotally, I hasten to add that other forms of
business organizations, such as partnerships, have apparently
been able to thrive despite any limitation on an individual
manager’s (partner’s) ability to exercise personal moral
judgment. 251
Moreover, it would seem to be folly to quash (versus find
ways of managing) dissenting moral viewpoints from corporate
decision making for a variety of reasons. Aside from the harm
this would cause to the officers individually, it also appears to
make poor business sense. It would serve to foster “groupthink,” a
dangerous phenomenon for both ethical and non-ethical business
reasons. 252 It cuts against the literature supporting “the value of
diversity to corporate culture and performance,” and studies
suggesting that “diverse firms have an economically meaningful
1–4% higher net profit margin and 2.5–6% higher return on
equity than comparable . . . less diverse firms.” 253 Indeed, a
movement to increase the diversity of corporate management has

248. Jennifer L. Kohn, Federalist #10 in Management #101: What Madison
Has to Teach Managers, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, 4–5 (June 1,
2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1845625 (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (Random House, 1937)) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Law Review).
249. See id. at 5 (discussing Madison’s use of a republic and representational
filtering process to mitigate the effects of factions) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO.
10, at 59 (James Madison) (Random House, 1937)).
250. See, e.g., SIMS, supra note 16, at 113–27 (addressing ethical decision
making within group contexts); Kruse, supra note 162, at 442–58 (addressing
moral conflicts of interest within the attorney-client relationship).
251. Cf. Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual
Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46
AM. BUS. L.J. 221, 221–24 (2009) (arguing that Delaware courts should not
apply default fiduciary duties to limited partnership and limited liability
corporation agreements).
252. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 62–66 (demonstrating the danger of
groupthink with historical examples).
253. Kohn, supra note 248, at 5.

64

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2012)

been afoot for some time now—and I see no reason that “moral
diversity” ought to be excluded from these efforts. 254
Conversations precipitated by dissenting moral opinions can
also fuel “the development of . . . corporate character” by
sensitizing the corporation and, when coupled with the disclosure
requirements suggested previously, 255 its constituencies to other
points of view and other firmly held standards of right and
wrong. 256 As Edwin Hartman explained:
Genuinely useful principles come out of our experience with
each other . . . . In the course of that experience certain values
and principles may change, for the better if we make moral
progress. We reach ever better principles and highest-order
desires through experience and conversations and negotiations
over a long time in a variety of circumstances. 257

Additionally, in large organizations, it is highly unlikely that
a moral objection posed by an officer is without support from
anyone else within the organization. More often, each officer
withholds moral judgment out of a fear of isolation and
ostracism. 258 The habit of speaking one’s mind with regard to
moral issues could have the salutary effect of bringing broadly
held, but rarely expressed, convictions to the fore. 259 At a
minimum, it may enable a critical mass of support to coalesce
254. See Bernard F. Matt & Nasrin Shahinpoor, Speaking Truth to Power:
The Courageous Organizational Dissenter, in MORAL COURAGE IN ORGANIZATIONS
157, 164–67 (Debra R. Comer & Gina Vega eds., 2011) (describing why and how
organizations should welcome moral dissenters in the organization’s culture).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 238–39 (suggesting a “noisy
withdrawal” requirement for resignations or firings due to a moral
disagreement).
256. See Geoff Moore, On the Implications of the Practice-Institution
Distinction: MacIntyre and the Application of Modern Virtue Ethics to Business,
12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 19, 30 (2002) (“The corporation will . . . through the
incorporation of the virtues of those who represent it, and of the virtues of
influential people in its recent past, be in a position to resist the corrupting
power of the organizations with which it . . . relates.”).
257. HARTMAN, supra note 159, at 177.
258. See JACOBS, supra note 187, at 200–01 (discussing the work of Richard
Nielsen regarding “managerial isolation” as a cause of corruption in business
organizations).
259. This would counter the “Abilene Paradox,” whereby groups “adopt
courses of action in direct opposition of the desires of many or all of their
members.” SIMS, supra note 16, at 53.
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around the position—much more support than the officer voicing
the concern might have previously imagined, and enough to make
a difference in corporate conduct. 260
Therefore, not only for the sake of its individual officers, but
for the good of the corporation as a whole, it would be wise for a
business to “welcome differing views not only on specific rules but
also on the nature of the good life” as well. 261 And although the
“difficulty of reaching a legitimate agreement about what is
morally good is real,” this disagreement is “not fatal to moral
discourse,” but rather can fuel it. 262
2. The Shareholder Primacy Norm Revisited
Thus far we have examined relief from the strictures of the
shareholder primacy norm in the form of an expansion of the
business judgment rule. But, of course, relief can be supplied in a
more direct way as well: the norm itself can be reformulated or
replaced. 263
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that expanding
the business judgment rule, as discussed previously, 264 could
itself shape the shareholder primacy norm. By expanding the rule
in a way specifically tailored to protect the exercise of conscience,
the law would be effectively exalting conscience over profits. This
is an example of the expressive function of the law, 265 and could
be expected to impact the way officers understand their
obligations within the firm. Thus, not only would such an
expansion afford practical protection (in the terms of a litigation
260. See Debra R. Comer & Susan D. Baker, I Defy with a Little Help from
My Friends: Raising an Organization’s Ethical Bar Through a Morally
Courageous Coalition, in MORAL COURAGE IN ORGANIZATIONS 171 (Debra R.
Comer & Gina Vega eds., 2011) (discussing the promotion of ethical behavior
through collective action).
261. See id.
262. HARTMAN, supra note 159, at 18.
263. See Dobson, supra note 180, at 129 (discussing a model of business in
which competition and external goods are not the defining characteristics and
which focuses on internal goods in practice-based communities).
264. See supra Part IV.D.1 (discussing ways to expand the business
judgment rule that serve individual officer and corporation interests).
265. See supra text accompanying note 177 (noting the ability of law to
influence individual behavior).
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defense) to corporate officers, but could also very well affect the
way officers understand their role and responsibilities within the
firm.
Beyond that, and more directly, one modest reformulation of
the existing norm would be to read “shareholder primacy” to
cover not simply the shareholders’ economic interests, but also
those sort of interests that human beings should ordinarily be
expected to have. Human beings are not mere economic
automatons, and for officers to treat them as such is an affront to
their dignity and not the fulfillment of their genuine wishes. 266 As
John Mackey notes, Adam Smith recognized this in The Theory of
Moral Sentiments, in which he explained that “human nature
isn’t just about self-interest. It also includes sympathy, empathy,
friendship, love, and the desire for social approval. As motives for
human behavior, these are at least as important as self-interest.
For many people, they are more important.” 267 Within the virtueethics tradition, Plato condemned as “pleonexia” that “sickness of
purpose” whereby an individual is fixated on unadulterated
materialistic self-interest. 268
Admittedly, most shareholders today are not individuals but
institutions. Nevertheless, with perhaps the exception of
sovereign wealth funds, these institutions are ultimately owned
by a human being (even if several degrees removed). And
regardless of ownership per se, all these institutions (including
sovereign wealth funds) are ultimately answerable to human
beings.
266. I have addressed this point in my previous scholarship. See Colombo,
supra note 120, at 267–68 (“To adopt a normative construct that ignores the
reality of those non-economic interests . . . would render a disservice to
stakeholders by denying the essence of their humanity.” (quoting Leo L. Clarke
& Edward D. Lyons, The Corporate Common Good: The Right and Obligation of
Managers to Do Good to Others, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 280 (2007))); Ronald J.
Colombo, Exposing the Myth of Homo Economicus, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
737 (2009) (reviewing MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE
ECONOMY (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008)).
267. Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business: A Reason Debate
Featuring Milton Friedman, Whole Foods’ John Mackey, and Cypress
Semiconductor’s T.J. Rodgers, REASON, Oct. 2005, at 29, 31–32 (citing ADAM
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1976)).
268. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 5.
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Another approach is to replace shareholder primacy with an
obligation to serve all the constituencies of the corporation—an
approach sometimes referred to as the “multi-fiduciary
approach.” 269 Although I have been critical of this approach (for it
does not enable the exercise of virtue per se, but rather simply
enlarges the number of private interests that directors must be
attentive to), 270 it would arguably be an improvement to the
status quo. For the multi-fiduciary approach could serve to
humanize and, consequently, moralize the corporation by forcing
its officers to prioritize something other than stock returns. 271
Either approach could be accomplished via a judicial reinterpretation of officers’ duties, or more directly via an
amendment of corporate charters to such effect. Although this
position has its supporters, it has been fiercely criticized as
well. 272 Its critics contend that corporate officers cannot be
expected to serve two masters 273 (let alone multiple stakeholders),
and the results will be unsatisfactory. 274
269. David Millon, Criminalization of Corporate Law: The Impact on
Shareholders and Other Constituents, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 101, 101 (2007).
270. See Colombo, supra note 120, at 284–85 (recognizing the problems
associated with a mandatory implementation of the stakeholder model).
271. See Dobson, supra note 180, at 129 (“[I]n this ‘enlightened’ business
community, competition, external goods, and markets would still be
characteristics. They would just no longer be the defining characteristics.”).
272. See generally Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating
Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173 (1997–1998) (examining the
normative positions taken in the debate regarding stakeholder theory and
arguing that by viewing corporations as mediating institutions, criticisms of the
theory do not fatally wound it); Andrew Keay, Stakeholder Theory in Corporate
Law: Has It Got What It Takes?, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 249 (2010)
(examining the arguments for and against stakeholder theory); Benedict
Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in the
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 193 (2005–2006)
(analyzing the origin, history, assumptions, and criticisms of stakeholder and
shareholder theories).
273. Matthew 6:24 (“No one can serve two masters. Either you will hate the
one and love the other, or you will be devoted to the one and despise the other.
You cannot serve both God and money.”).
274. See George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting
Worse, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1107–10 (2007–2008) (criticizing
arguments for stakeholder participation in corporate governance as costly and
inefficient, particular in light of the globalization of capital markets); John
Hendry, Missing the Target: Normative Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate
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These critiques are formidable, and have contributed to my
own unease with stakeholder approaches. 275 A closely related
approach, which I shall set forth momentarily, may offer a
modest improvement. 276 Predicated upon corporate excellence,
this approach does not aim at satisfying a variety of (somewhat
arbitrary) constituencies but rather on simply doing everything
well. The focus is on the craft of business, and not the
satisfaction of various stakeholders per se. This subtle shift may
achieve much of the same result as a multi-fiduciary approach,
while side-stepping some of its difficulties.
3. Importance of Corporate Culture
Enabling officers to exercise virtue does little if the officers
have no interest in availing themselves of such newfound
freedom.
Moreover, to this point we have largely presupposed a
conflict between the officer’s morality and his duty within the
corporation—a conflict that Peter Drucker and others have
soundly rejected on philosophical grounds. 277 Or, at best, we
have envisioned a corporation where the exercise of virtue was
allowed but not necessarily encouraged. And although conflict
and free rein can indeed be the seeds of moral progress, the
ordinary way in which virtue is developed and nurtured is via a
supportive and reinforcing environment. 278 Indeed, sustained
Governance Debate, 11 BUS. ETHICS Q. 159, 173 (2001) (“Despite all the attention
given to normative stakeholder theory over the past decade, no one within the
business ethics community had made the case for a realistic version of the
theory such as might provide a viable practical alternative to the shareholder
perspective.”).
275. See Colombo, supra note 120, at 284–85 (recognizing the problems
associated with a mandatory implementation of the stakeholder model).
276. See infra text accompanying notes 289–97 (discussing an approach in
which corporations prioritize “internal goods” such as craftsmanship over
wealth maximization).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 182–83 (noting Peter Drucker’s
views on ethics and his rejection of the notion that individuals must leave their
morality at the boardroom door).
278. See supra Part I and text accompanying notes 261–62 (discussing the
failures of regulation in fostering virtue and noting the contribution
disagreement makes to promoting moral discourse).
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moral action usually “requires the support of the right sort of
community.” 279
A solution premised upon a broadening of business judgment
rule protections is therefore minimalistic. It assumes an
unhealthy antagonism between an officer’s understanding of the
“right thing to do” and the obligations of his or her position
within the firm—“a kind of ethical schizophrenia.” 280 “To
redescribe this experience in stakeholder terminology, we could
say that individuals find the service of shareholder value in
tension with their personal values, which would often support a
greater degree of priority being accorded to fellow employees,
suppliers, or customers . . . .” 281
A solution premised on an understanding of shareholder
primacy that encompasses noneconomic interests is better, but it
too merely enables, rather than encourages virtue. A far better
solution would be an environment where the practice and
development of virtue was actively encouraged by the
corporation. 282 Indeed, “our deepest values . . . are profoundly
influenced by our community.” 283 For officers, the corporation is
their community or, at a minimum, one of their communities.
Thus, what is needed is a corporate culture that fosters virtue.
“Corporate culture is the body of shared beliefs, values,
expectations, and norms of behavior that shape life in the
organization and account for certain observable artifacts.” 284
Corporate culture is essential to virtue and morality because “it is
a vehicle for imparting and maintaining the moral principles and
the values, good and bad, that animate life in the
organization.” 285 Scholarship has increasingly documented the
279. HARTMAN, supra note 159, at 68.
280. Moore, supra note 256, at 25.
281. Id.
282. To some, this is not possible in the corporation. To others, the
corporation can be a venue in which virtue is truly exercised, developed, and
rewarded. See id. at 26 (“[W]e can surely take a more positive view of business
activity . . . with its potential for moral development through the possession and
exercise of the virtues.”). But see id. at 26 (recognizing the argument that
capitalism “undermine[s] the possession and exercise of the virtues”).
283. HARTMAN, supra note 159, at 146.
284. Id. at 149.
285. Id. at 150; see also SIMS, supra note 16, at 107–12 (describing various
approaches to aiding ethical decision making in corporate environments).
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“impact of organisational culture on the ethical standards and
moral practices of people in organisations.” 286
Businesses have recognized this for quite some time, which
explains why “corporations and other institutionalized
collectivities socialize their members to internalize group
perceptions and values.” 287 The mainstream business and
corporate law literature is filled with scholarship on this
phenomenon. One example would be an article by William Wines
and J. Brooke Hamilton, which identifies no less than twelve
“organizational structures that block good conduct”:
1) “Ambiguity about priorities”
2) “Separation
of
[i]mplementation”

[p]olicy

[d]ecisions

from

3) “Strict line of command”
4) “Strong role models”
5) “Division of work”
6) “Task group loyalty”
7) “Protection from outside intervention”
8) “Believing [y]our [o]wn [s]tory [t]oo [m]uch”
9) “Giving [y]ourself [t]oo [m]uch [c]redit”
10) “Circling the [w]agons and [d]emonizing [c]ritics”
11) “Praising A and [r]ewarding B”
12) “Undervaluing the [p]ublic [g]ood” 288

Within the virtue-ethics tradition, MacIntyre suggests that
the sustainability of virtue in a firm will depend upon the degree
to which the corporation prioritizes “internal goods” (such as the
craft of service or production itself and the well-being of the
286. Amanda Sinclair, Approaches to Organisational Culture and Ethics, 12
J. BUS. ETHICS 63, 63 (1993). That said, the most effective way to manipulate
organizational culture to foster improved ethical standards and morality
remains controversial. See id. at 70–71.
287. Michael J. Phillips, Corporate Moral Responsibility: When It Might
Matter, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 555, 568 (1995). See also generally ROB GOFFEE &
GARETH JONES, THE CHARACTER OF A CORPORATION (1998).
288. Wines & Hamilton, supra note 13, at 61–69.
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corporation’s various constituencies) over “external goods” (such
as “profit and shareholder value”). 289
To be clear, MacIntyre readily acknowledges that “a focus on
external goods is both a necessary and worthwhile function of the
corporation.” 290 Investors need to be rewarded for the risk they
take on, and it is good to provide a means of generating returns
on excess capital. The problem arises when this focus comes at
the expense of excellence, craftsmanship, and concern for the
individuals and communities impacted by the corporation’s
activities. 291 Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Centesimus Annus
articulated this position quite well, and it is worth quoting from
at some length:
When a firm makes a profit, this means that productive
factors have been properly employed and corresponding
human needs have been duly satisfied. But profitability is not
the only indicator of a firm’s condition. It is possible for the
financial accounts to be in order, and yet for the people—who
make up the firm’s most valuable asset—to be humiliated and
their dignity offended. Besides being morally inadmissible,
this will eventually have negative repercussions on the firm’s
economic efficiency. In fact, the purpose of a business firm is
not simply to make a profit, but is to be found in its very
existence as a community of persons who in various ways are
endeavouring to satisfy their basic needs, and who form a
particular group at the service of the whole of society. Profit is
a regulator of the life of a business, but it is not the only one;
other human and moral factors must also be considered which,
in the long term, are at least equally important for the life of a
business. 292

Thus, to the extent that a corporation’s focus is on
excellence—the excellence of its product and the excellence in its
treatment of its various constituencies—the corporation is fertile
for the development, growth, and exercise of virtue.
289. Moore, supra note 256, at 28–29.
290. Id. at 29.
291. See id. (“There may, for example, be times when the practice becomes
so introverted and self-satisfied that it no longer sets out to achieve ‘those
standards of excellence which are appropriate, and partially definitive of, that
activity.’”).
292. JOHN PAUL II, ON THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF RERUM NOVARUM:
CENTESIMUS ANNUS 68–69 (1991).
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Geoff Moore, a virtue ethicist in the tradition of MacIntyre,
also hit upon the importance of instilling a spirit of
“craftsmanship” in the work of the corporate officer. 293 As
explained in his article Humanizing Business:
The ideal of craftsmanship is to create that which has quality
or excellence; personal satisfaction, pride in accomplishment,
and a sense of dignity derived from the consequent selfdevelopment are the motivations. In an “excellent” company, it
is this ideal that permeates the firm, and management should
provide the moral example of such an ideal; a business
management craftsperson attempts to create a quality
organisation, and quality products and services are the result
of such an organisation. 294

The component parts of taking craftsmanship seriously
within the corporation, according to Moore, are manifold. They
include:
• concentration on “the intrinsic value of work in
business organisations rather than its instrumental
value,” 295
• a dedication both to “building community” within the
business as part of their responsibilities and to
establishing trans-corporate associations that promote
and inculcate craftsmanship, 296 and
• identifying and inculcating those virtues particularly
necessary to craftsmanship and the corporate
enterprise, which Moore suggests include justice,
courage, truthfulness, temperance, prudence, trust,
and trustworthiness. 297
In short, a major step toward creating a corporate
environment more hospitable to virtue would be to invert the
means-end relationship between product and profit. The
production of a product (or the provision of a service) should not
be viewed as a means to the end of profits, but rather profits
should be viewed as a means to the end of production (and, along
293. See Moore, supra note 6, at 247.
294. Id. at 248 (quoting Sherwin Klein, Don Quixote and the Problem of
Idealism and Realism in Business Ethics, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 43, 55 (1998)).
295. Id. at 249.
296. Id. at 250–51.
297. See id. at 251.
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with the end of production, comes the related factors of
employment, customer satisfaction, and the like). As
revolutionary and ambitious as this inversion may seem, it is
actually not that far removed from the American Law Institute’s
own formulation of business purpose. In its comments regarding
Section 2.01, “The Objective and Conduct of the Corporation,” the
American Law Institute explicitly recognized that “the
corporation is a social as well as an economic institution,”
concluding that “its pursuit of the economic objective must be
constrained by social imperatives and may be qualified by social
needs” 298:
e. Corporate objective and corporate conduct. The subject
matter of these Principles is the governance of business
corporations. The business corporation is an instrument
through which capital is assembled for the activities of
producing and distributing goods and services and making
investments. These Principles take as a basic proposition that
a business corporation should have as its objective the conduct
of such activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain. This objective, which will hereafter be
referred to as “the economic objective,” is embodied in
Subsection (a). The basic proposition is qualified in the
manner stated in Subsection (b), which speaks to the conduct
of the corporation. The provisions of Subsection (b) reflect a
recognition that the corporation is a social as well as an
economic institution, and accordingly that its pursuit of the
economic objective must be constrained by social imperatives
and may be qualified by social needs. 299

Moreover, the concept that a corporation’s existence is not
primarily tied to profits, but rather to more substantive and
qualitative undertakings, has already been suggested by other
corporate legal scholars. Daniel Greenwood, for example, has
explained:
Corporations are not only about increasing share value. They
are also about creating jobs for employees and suppliers, and
those jobs consist not only of paychecks but also of quality of
life and quality of work issues: relationships, individual
empowerment, self-improvement and education, health and
298. PRINCIPLES
OF
CORPORATE
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 cmt. e (1992).
299. Id.

GOVERNANCE:
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safety, hours that allow for families, movement and stability in
our various communities, support in sickness and old age and
for dependents. Corporations also exist to beautify our cities,
to provide products for consumers, to support charities, to
enhance and not merely destroy our environment. 300

Further still, some highly successful businesses are already
putting this thinking into practice. Whole Foods immediately
leaps to mind. Its CEO, John Mackey, explicitly disavows the
profit-maximization objective. 301 He acknowledges that this may
very well be the objective of the company’s investors but adds
that it is not the objective of its other stakeholders. 302 Under his
leadership, Whole Foods strives to provide value to all its
constituencies. 303 Tellingly, he places responsibility for “defin[ing]
the purpose of the business” on its officers. 304 As he bluntly puts
it, “we ‘hired’ our original investors. They didn’t hire us.”305
None of this is particularly novel, though it has been
obscured by the triumph of shareholder primacy over the course
of the twentieth century. 306 Originally, corporations were
chartered (and thereby granted the privileges of the corporate
form) in order to primarily advance some public good. 307 The
eclipse of this common-good orientation by the modern privateprofit orientation is, historically speaking, a rather recent
phenomenon. 308 A broader conceptualization of corporate
purposes and responsibilities would, therefore, be largely a return
to the roots of corporate law. By tethering this broader
300. Greenwood, supra note 169, at 843–44.
301. See Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business, supra note 267, at
29 (stating that Mackey “strongly disagree[s]” with the view that “the only social
responsibility a law-abiding business has is to maximize profits for the
shareholders”).
302. See id. (noting that other groups of stakeholders in the company “define
the purpose of the business in terms of [their] own needs and desires”).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation,
34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1127–30 (2011) (detailing the development of the
“shareholder value” movement—the notion that “the corporation existed to
create shareholder value”).
307. See Colombo, supra note 120, at 251–52.
308. See id. at 253–55.
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conceptualization to the concepts of excellence and
craftsmanship, we may be able to avoid some of the more vexing
challenges of the “two-masters” problem raised by multi-fiduciary
approaches. 309 For under multi-fiduciary approaches, corporate
management would be subject (and answerable) to the potentially
conflicting pulls of various constituencies as expressed via
constituency representatives. Each constituency’s representative
would most likely be pressing for his or her constituency’s own
particularized private interest without necessarily regarding the
greater good of the corporate enterprise as a whole. By contrast,
an approach to excellence and craftsmanship entails satisfying a
corporation’s constituencies (and then some) in the manner, and
to the extent, that the corporation’s own management perceives
as best. Management’s own vision and definition of “excellence”
governs. This should serve to reduce the potential conflict and
dissonance occasioned by strict and clear lines of responsibility to
a handful of sometimes competing constituencies.
In any event, even if it were easy to formulate and agree
upon a virtue-based (or excellence-based) corporate culture, it
remains incredibly difficult to put such thinking into practice.
Moore recognized this. He warned against the “corrupting” pull
toward instrumentalism, and stressed that “there needs to be the
commitment to exercise the virtues not only in pursuit of the
internal goods of the practice which benefits the individual
directly, but also against the corporation when it becomes, as it
inevitably will at various times, too focused on external goods.” 310
The temptation to put profits ahead of principle is strong and
omnipresent, and officers must be selected and trained for
resistance to this temptation. In other words, we need to identify
and inculcate the courage to speak out, blow whistles, and take a
stand against inappropriate corporate conduct—precisely the
opposite characteristics so valued in “company men” today. 311
Additionally, we need to remove such temptations whenever
309. See supra text accompanying notes 273–74 (describing criticisms of the
“multi-fiduciary approach”).
310. Moore, supra note 6, at 250.
311. See supra text accompanying note 206 (observing that qualities
typically valued in the corporate environment are oftentimes at odds with
qualities valued elsewhere).
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possible. 312 Even the best of human beings are still, after all,
human beings. For this reason, conflicts of interest and
opportunities for wrongdoing need to be minimized as much as
reasonably possible. Past practices need to be re-examined, for
sometimes they can “create support for immoral principles and
practices in a way that is hard for even a moral person to
discern.” 313 Virtue, especially bourgeoning virtue, can be a fragile
thing, and it would be wise to remove whatever obstacles we
reasonably can to prevent its derailment.
Solomon has suggested a “professionalization” of the
corporate officer’s corps, which may very well be part of the
solution. 314 Professionals are frequently called upon, and indeed
expected, to exercise independent judgment, and officers who
viewed themselves as professionals could contribute to a
corporate culture less subject to groupthink, and more open to
diverse moral perspectives. 315
Part and parcel with an improved corporate culture would be
“ethics training”—efforts to directly inculcate ethical values. 316
Although some are optimistic that good behavior can be taught,
others are less sanguine. 317 In keeping with the virtue-ethics
tradition, they are of the opinion that virtue is something learned
and developed over the course of a lifetime, not something that a
corporation can easily and readily engender. 318 For an ethics
training program to bear fruit, it would seem as though its
participants would need to be already in possession of a modicum
of virtue. 319
312. See Gilbert Harman, No Character or Personality, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 87,
91 (2003) (suggesting that the best way to avoid vice is to avoid those “People!
Places! Things!” that present opportunities for vice); Wines & Hamilton, supra
note 13, at 56 (“Businesses need to keep out of the back seat of the car on the
back row of the drive-in movie because, as our priests, teachers, and parents
would say, if you go there, putting yourself in that near occasion of sin, you are
going to fall.”).
313. HARTMAN, supra note 159, at 146.
314. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 136.
315. See id. at 140–43.
316. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 147–65 (describing the objectives and
methods of ethics training).
317. See id. 148–50; SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 4.
318. See SIMS, supra note 16, at 148–50; SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 4.
319. And even then, the potential of such programs is probably limited.
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This suggests that an essential component of achieving a
virtue-friendly corporate culture would be to take ethics and
virtue quite seriously in the firm’s hiring and promotion
process. 320 Instead of concentrating solely on technical prowess
and ability, firms could diligently recruit, screen, and advance
candidates on the basis of character as well. 321 This holds, in my
opinion, the greatest promise. It would seem far easier to locate
individuals of character and virtue and train them in the arts of a
particular business, rather than the other way around.
Fortunately, the dichotomy between an “excellent” and
“ethical” business on the one hand, and a “profitable” business on
the other, is increasingly shown to be a false one. 322 It is
becoming ever more clear that “the integrity of the corporation
and of the individual within the corporation is the essential
ingredient in the overall viability and vitality of the business
world.” 323 Virtue and an attention to excellence do not hinder
corporate success; they advance it. 324
4. A Product of Society at Large
It must be recognized that business corporations are a
component part of the overarching culture and society of their
times. 325 The moral fiber of a corporation “will depend upon the
extent to which the surrounding culture adheres to the tenets of
Robert Solomon suggested that the true value of such programs would not be in
inculcating ethical principles per se, but rather “to make people more
comfortable facing moral complexity.” SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 4. In other
words, their value lies in training people to better resolve moral disputes (via
recourse to their preexisting moral understandings), more so than training them
to be moral. See id. at 4–5.
320. See HARTMAN, supra note 159, at 17–18; SIMS, supra note 16, at 109.
321. Undoubtedly, firms already do this to a limited extent. The question
here is one of degree and prioritization.
322. SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 21.
323. Id.
324. See id. But see Stephanie Strom, To Be Good Citizens, Report Says,
Companies Should Just Focus on Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at B6
(reporting on a working paper by Daniel Altman and Jonathan Berman that
argues that a focus on social responsibility programs will provide less social
good than if companies just focus on their bottom lines).
325. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 149.
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virtue ethics. If the culture nurtures the virtues . . . then morally
enlightened business activity will flourish.” 326 As one philosopher
opined, “[t]he moral impoverishment of contemporary business,
therefore, is inevitable given the moral impoverishment of
modernity.” 327
Regardless of the degree to which one agrees with the
opinion above, whether an individual will pursue a life of virtue
or vice is quite often something established in the cradle (or
shortly thereafter). 328 Although an individual’s various roles in
life go a long way in shaping his or her development as a human
being, 329 it is important to remember that each individual “brings
with her or himself to each role qualities of mind and character
that belong to her or him qua individual and not qua roleplayer.” 330 If such qualities are poorly developed, I posit that
there is very little corporate law can do to remedy the situation.
If, on the other hand, these qualities are indeed developed,
then there are certainly things, as we have discussed, that
corporate law can do to nurture them. On a broader level, it
would seem that casuistry ought to be avoided, as this distinction
between “private” and “public” morality seems to be at the heart
of some very grave evils. 331 We need our corporations populated
by individuals who “understand themselves as accountable, not
only in their roles, but also as rational individuals.” 332
Thus, I agree with Alasdair MacIntyre that “[v]irtue ethics is
not antithetical to business activity.” 333 Indeed, “[i]n a virtuebased culture business is an entirely moral pursuit.” 334
Unfortunately, ours is not a virtue-based culture. Economics
and wealth, not virtue, have become “the obsession of all modern
326. John Dobson, MacIntyre’s Position on Business: A Response to Wicks, 7
BUS. ETHICS Q. 125, 127 (1997).
327. Id. at 128.
328. See Kohlberg, supra note 53, at 394 (“[M]ost children know the basic
moral rules and conventions of our society by the first grade.”).
329. See MacIntyre, supra note 159, at 311–14.
330. Id.
331. See id. at 312–13 (commenting on the need for individuals to reflect
critically upon the morality of their role-specific obligations).
332. See id. at 316.
333. Dobson, supra note 326, at 128.
334. Id.

TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE

79

societies.” 335 As E.F. Schumacher put it: “Call a thing immoral or
ugly, soul-destroying or a degradation of man, a peril to the peace
of the world or to the well-being of future generations; as long as
you have not shown it to be ‘uneconomic’ you have not really
questioned its right to exist, grow, and prosper.” 336
In fact, none less than John Maynard Keynes, whose
economic theories have dominated Western economic planning
since World War II, opined that virtue is inconsistent with our
economy, remarking that when it comes to business and the
economy, “foul is useful and fair is not” 337:
Keynes . . . advised us that the time was not yet for a “return
to some of the most sure and certain principles of religion and
traditional virtue—that avarice is a vice, that the exaction of
usury is a misdemeanor, and the love of money is detestable.”
Economic progress, he counseled, is obtainable only if we
employ those powerful human drives of selfishness, which
religion and traditional wisdom universally call upon us to
resist. The modern economy is propelled by a frenzy of greed
and indulges in an orgy of envy, and these are not accidental
features but the very causes of its expansionist success. 338

As Schumacher points out in response to Keynes, “[t]he
question is whether such causes can be effective for long or
whether they carry within themselves the seeds of
destruction.” 339 Schumacher continues:
If human vices such as greed and envy are systematically
cultivated, the inevitable result is nothing less than a collapse
of intelligence. A man driven by greed or envy loses the power
of seeing things as they really are, of seeing things in their
roundness and wholeness, and his very successes become
failures. If whole societies become infected by these vices, they
may indeed achieve astonishing things but they become
increasingly incapable of solving the most elementary
problems of everyday existence. The Gross National Product
335. SCHUMACHER, supra note 37, at 44.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 32.
338. Id. at 31–32; see also SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 17 (noting that “[s]uch
quaint notions as integrity and virtue have been put in the back files, and such
macho mock values as ruthlessness and raw ambition have been promoted to
the status of ideals”).
339. SCHUMACHER, supra note 37, at 32.
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may rise rapidly: as measured by statisticians but not as
experienced by actual people, who find themselves oppressed
by increasing frustration, alienation, insecurity, and so
forth. 340

Further, one cannot ignore the hyper-individualism that so
indelibly marks the American psyche. 341 Any efforts at
redirecting corporations upon a more communitarian path,
especially in the United States, faces this additional hurdle. In a
society that generally exalts the individual over the community,
it should come as no surprise that corporate managers drawn
from such society might have difficulty in accepting the notion of
broadened corporate responsibilities. 342
In any event, the moral shortcomings of the modern business
corporation are largely a reflection of the moral shortcomings of
modern society in general. 343 This is a problem beyond the reach
of corporate law.
5. Structural Remedies
The structure of the modern corporation has been identified
as a contributing factor to the amorality of corporate decision
making. 344 In this section, I shall consider ways in which
corporate structure could be reformed so as to encourage greater
development and exercise of virtue within the corporation.
One suggestion, put forth by Alejo Sison, is to reintegrate
ownership and control to the extent possible. 345 Simply put,
340. Id.
341. See SOLOMON, supra note 21, at 74.
342. Ironically, and perhaps helpfully in light of the preceding, the
suggestions proffered in this Article are themselves individualistic in that they
are built upon individual virtue and integrity (which is the heart of virtue
ethics). See id. at 103.
343. The importance of culture, generally, on behavior is difficult to
understate. See James Q. Wilson, Hard Times, Fewer Crimes, WALL ST. J., May
28–29, 2011, at C1 (observing that due to cultural changes, the economic
downturn of 2007–09 did not result in more crime, bucking the predictions of
most experts).
344. See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text (discussing the
structural factors that contribute to the amoral corporate environment).
345. See generally ALEJO JOSE G. SISON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
ETHICS: AN ARISTOTELIAN PERSPECTIVE (2008).
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corporate officers should own a greater amount of stock in their
corporations than is now usually the case. 346 There are myriad
ways in which this could be implemented, from requiring a buy-in
upon hiring, to distributing shares as part of compensation.
However accomplished, a management team that both controls
and owns a significant stake in the corporation is less likely to
suffer from the phenomenon of dispersed moral responsibility.
The powerful concept of ownership and the moral responsibilities
that are understood to accompany ownership could help
embolden corporate officers to take greater personal
responsibility for actions undertaken by them on behalf of the
corporation. 347
With regard to globalization, and ever-growing corporate
hierarchies, Schumacher proposes some solutions in his classic
book Small is Beautiful. 348 As its title suggests, Schumacher’s
book forcefully propounds the thesis that smaller-scale, local
businesses are preferable to larger-scale, global businesses for a
variety of reasons. 349 Of particular concern for the purposes of
this Article is that smaller-scale, local businesses do not suffer (or
do not suffer as much) from the defects of the modern megacorporation. Namely, small, local businesses are, all things being
equal, in better touch with their customers and other
constituencies than their larger counterparts. This closeness
serves as a bulwark against the dehumanizing nature that
characterizes most transactions with big businesses nowadays—
perhaps best exemplified by the computerized, labrynthine
gauntlet that confronts anyone who places a telephone call to
their corporation of choice. By keeping transactions “human,”
346. See id. at 95 (arguing that “[f]rom the viewpoint of corporate
citizenship, therefore, shareholding managers represent the stakeholder group
best equipped to govern the corporation”).
347. Even though most corporate scholars no longer view shareholders as
owners of the corporation, almost everyone else still buys into this traditional
conceptualization. See Velasco, supra note 122. Thus, the concept of ownership
can be expected to assert its effects on stock-holding officers.
348. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL (HarperCollins 2010).
349. See id. at 37 (“Small-scale operations, no matter how numerous, are
always less likely to be harmful to the natural environment than large-scale
ones. . . . It is moreover obvious that men organised in small units will take
better care of their bit of land or other natural resources than anonymous
companies or megalomanic governments . . . .”).
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smaller businesses do not transform individuals (from employees
to customers) into anonymities.
Schumacher acknowledged that the modern, gigantic, global
corporation is here to stay, but he points out that some of its
shortcomings can nevertheless be blunted. 350 Borrowing from the
doctrine of subsidiarity, 351 Schumacher urged corporations to
decentralize their operations as much as reasonably possible. 352
In his own words: “The fundamental task is to achieve smallness
within large organisations.” 353 Experience shows that such a
business approach is not only possible, but profitable. 354
The advantage of such an approach, from a virtue-ethics
perspective, would be to replicate (to a degree) the more human
feel that ordinarily accompanies small business transactions.
This, in turn, provides more fertile ground for human virtue to
develop, as it lacks the dehumanizing distance, size, and
anonymity that mark most large, global corporations.
V. Conclusion
“Character is destiny” remarked the Greek philosopher
Heraclitus in the sixth century B.C. 355 And the economic crisis
that the world is still reeling from is, in large part, the
repercussions of a crisis of character.
For at its root, the crisis was caused by a combination of
nonfeasance and malfeasance—a failure of people to do their duty
350. See SCHUMACHER, supra note 37, at 260 (laying out the five principles of
his theory of large-scale organizations).
351. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (detailing the principle
of subsidiarity).
352. SCHUMACHER, supra note 37, at 260–62 (arguing that a large
corporation’s “task is to look at the organisation’s activities one by one and set
up as many [semi-autonomous units] as may seem reasonable and possible”).
353. Id. at 259.
354. See id. at 68–69 (providing General Motors and the British National
Coal Board as examples of successful uses of a decentralized approach). The
drive to squeeze every bit of profit out of business is what causes many to
eschew such an approach. “The substance of man cannot be measured by Gross
National Product.” Id. at 21.
355. See HERACLITUS, ON THE UNIVERSE fragment 1, 121 (W.H.S. Jones
trans., Loeb Classical Library 1931), quoted in G. Gordon Liddy, Character,
Conscience, and Destiny, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1975, 1975 (1998).

TOWARD A NEXUS OF VIRTUE

83

and honor their obligations. These are moral shortcomings—
character flaws.
But in response, our policymakers and pundits do not offer a
solution that gets to this root cause. Instead, they promote more
regulation, less regulation, increased reliance on market-based
incentives, and decreased reliance on market-based incentives. If
the correct mix of solutions is chosen and well implemented, it just
might, possibly, forestall the next crisis temporarily. 356
We can do better. Virtue can help.
Although it may be too much to hope for a more virtuous
civilization, it should not be too much to hope for business
enterprises that are at least on par with prevailing moral
standards. Unfortunately, we lack even that.
Due to the structure of the modern business firm and the
operation of corporate law, officers in today’s corporations are
crippled from exercising the virtue that ordinary human beings
ordinarily exercise. Our challenge, therefore, is to find a way to
remedy this situation.
If we accept the prevailing understanding of the corporation
(as a nexus of contracts), responsibility for corporate virtue should
be entrusted to its officers. This is because corporate officers have
the greatest interest in, and are in the best position to effect, the
exercise of virtue within the corporation. Paramount, therefore, is
the character and virtue of the corporate officer.
Robert Solomon insightfully observed that “character is
vulnerable to environment but it is also a bulwark against
environment.” 357 This suggests a two-pronged approach to the
issue of corporate virtue, an approach that focuses on the officer’s
character specifically, while at the same time focusing on the
corporate culture more generally. We need our corporations to
actively recruit and promote individuals of virtue as officers, to
assist these officers in the development of their virtue, to empower
them to exercise their virtue, and to clear away the temptations
that would undermine their virtue.

356. Or, on a less sanguine note, one could say that our policymakers
“always tend to try and cure a disease by intensifying its causes.” SCHUMACHER,
supra note 37, at 39.
357. Solomon, supra note 206, at 46.
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There are some who have argued that such a firm would
“rapidly perish” due to the competitiveness of the marketplace. 358
Indeed, many companies that pursue a balanced approach to
profits, that is, an approach that takes into serious consideration
other, noneconomic values, eschew public company status because
of the pressures of the capital markets. 359 “And since no one knows
when ‘enough is enough,’ the drive for increased profitability
remains a key corporate objective [for the public company]. Hence,
the inherent tendency to avarice continues to exist, exacerbated by
the power of the financial markets.”360
If such is the case, if corporate virtue is an impossible dream,
then I do not believe it is untoward to call for a rethinking of the
modern business corporation and the economic system within
which it is situated. As Edwin Hartman remarked: “If a productive
business system requires people of bad character doing bad deeds,
we must at the very least try to determine the benefits of that
productivity and its costs to the moral fabric of society.” 361
I do not, however, believe that corporate virtue is a futile hope.
Indeed, I conclude with Geoff Moore that virtue-driven firms are
not only possible, but likely to flourish:
They would do so because the concentration on excellence in the
practice and not on external goods per se, would, in many cases,
actually improve their performance across a range of
parameters rather than diminish it. Remembering that one of
the cardinal virtues is phronesis or practical wisdom, reminds
us that there is a certain astuteness expected of the virtuous. 362

That is, after all, the central premise of virtue ethics. Good
people do good things to the benefit of all. Corporate law needs to
unleash the power of this simple insight by allowing officers to
realize and act upon the fullest potential of their goodness.

358. Moore, supra note 256, at 20 (quoting J. Dobson, The Feminist Firm: A
Comment, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q. 227, 227 (1996)).
359. See Moore, supra note 6, at 240 (using Applied Energy Systems (AES)
and Levi Strauss as examples of companies that, fearing potential moral
contamination by the financial markets, either only reluctantly went public, in
the case of AES, or went private, in the case of Levi Strauss).
360. Id.
361. See HARTMAN, supra note 159, at 92.
362. Moore, supra note 256, at 30.

